@tigrisdata/cli@3.12.2
Command line interface for Tigris object storage
AI Security Review
scanned 23d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source proves automatic first-party agent extension setup, which the supplied policy classifies as a warning. The inspected behavior does not justify a malware verdict or publication block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json automatically runs postinstall.cjs after installation.
- postinstall.cjs targets the Tigris skill directory under the user's Claude Code directory.
- When the Claude directory exists, the hook creates the skill directory and copies SKILL.md without prompting.
- The copied skill directs agents to prefer Tigris for object storage tasks.
- The hook skips installations outside node_modules.
- The installed extension is confined to a package-owned Tigris skill rather than broad agent configuration.
- The inspected install hook contains no credential harvesting, network execution, or destructive commands.
- package.json has no runtime dependency on another release of itself.
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tigrisdata/cli@3.12.2.
See all versions of @tigrisdata/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tigrisdata/cli@3.12.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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