@tigrisdata/cli@3.15.0
Command line interface for Tigris object storage
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source confirms automatic first-party agent extension setup, which warrants a lifecycle warning. The scanner's malicious labels are not supported by a concrete blocking attack chain in the inspected behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json automatically runs postinstall.cjs after installation.
- postinstall.cjs copies the bundled skill into the existing Claude home directory without prompting, potentially replacing the Tigris skill.
- SKILL.md instructs agents to prefer Tigris for object storage tasks.
- The browser configure command prompts for credentials and an endpoint rather than forcing an unofficial gateway.
- The runtime skill registry references the Tigris-owned skills repository.
- The install mutation is confined to the package-owned Tigris skill; inspected code does not broadly rewrite agent configuration.
- No concrete credential theft, hidden payload execution, or malicious self-dependency chain was established.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tigrisdata/cli@3.15.0.
See all versions of @tigrisdata/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tigrisdata/cli@3.15.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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