@tigrisdata/cli@3.17.0
Command line interface for Tigris object storage
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook silently installs a package-owned skill into an existing Claude Code configuration, which qualifies as agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source does not establish the scanner’s unrelated credential-forwarding claim.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs postinstall.cjs during installation.
- The hook copies the bundled skill only when a Claude directory and the skill source exist.
- The destination is the Tigris skill directory under Claude’s home configuration.
- The skill describes Tigris object-storage CLI use, consistent with the package’s purpose.
- Browser login uses a saved endpoint or the Tigris service default; the inspected code does not establish forwarding to an unrelated fixed gateway.
- The postinstall hook does not make broad agent configuration changes; its observed write is limited to the package-owned skill file.
- The inspected browser login path selects a saved endpoint or the Tigris default.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tigrisdata/cli@3.17.0.
See all versions of @tigrisdata/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tigrisdata/cli@3.17.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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