@tigrisdata/cli@3.17.1
Command line interface for Tigris object storage
AI Security Review
scanned 16h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package runs an install hook that conditionally installs its own Tigris skill into an existing Claude skills directory without an explicit opt-in. The inspected skill is product-related, and the reviewed source does not establish broader control changes or data disclosure, supporting a warning rather than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs postinstall.cjs during dependency installation.
- The install hook copies the package skill into an existing ~/.claude/skills/tigris directory without an explicit opt-in.
- The copied skill provides Tigris object-storage CLI instructions and is marked not user-invocable.
- The inspected dependency code parses proxy CONNECT response headers; it does not establish an attack surface.
- The hook only attempts the copy when both the Claude directory and packaged skill exist.
- The skill describes Tigris storage commands and the inspected content does not show private prompt or response export.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tigrisdata/cli@3.17.1.
See all versions of @tigrisdata/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tigrisdata/cli@3.17.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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