---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@titan-design/active-work"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@titan-design/active-work/v/0.8.0.md"
package: "@titan-design/active-work"
report_status: "published"
title: "@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.8.0"
---

# @titan-design/active-work@0.8.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.8.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. Package installation changes an existing Claude Code control surface without an interactive prompt. It replaces the package-named skill and adds an active-work slash command.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-15T16:54:21.532Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-15T16:55:25.382Z
- **Download time:** 770 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1259 ms
- **AI review time:** 61820 ms
- **Total time:** 63850 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Package installation changes an existing Claude Code control surface without an interactive prompt. It replaces the package-named skill and adds an active-work slash command.

- **Trigger:** npm installs or updates the package while ~/.claude exists.

- **Impact:** Future Claude Code sessions can load package-supplied instructions and invoke its CLI.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, claude-commands/aw-prompt.md

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-15T16:55:25.382Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Postinstall copies a skill and command into Claude Code directories.

- **Rationale:** This is not concrete malware: the hook is transparent, local-only, and does not establish a self-dependent lifecycle chain. It is nevertheless an unconsented install-time modification of an AI-agent extension surface, so it should be warned rather than published as clean.

- **Files touched:** ~/.claude/skills/active-work, ~/.claude/commands/aw-prompt.md

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 94.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** The package runs a postinstall hook automatically., The hook deletes and replaces a Claude Code skill, then installs a slash command in the user's Claude configuration., The installed skill can direct Claude Code to run this package's CLI and treat package-generated context as authoritative.

- **Evidence against:** The postinstall hook copies only bundled local files and contains no network or credential-exfiltration code., No self-dependency or automatic nested lifecycle chain is declared., MCP registration, daemon startup, and persistent service setup are reached through the explicit active-work setup command.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @titan-design/active-work@0.8.0.

- Review the evidence and your use of @titan-design/active-work@0.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/dist/cli.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L132: }
L133: const cwd = path.resolve(process.cwd());
L134: if (isInside(cwd, from)) {
...
L908: frontmatter: raw.frontmatter,
L909: body: raw.body,
L910: prefix
...
L1527: }
L1528: function parseWorktreePorcelain(stdout) {
L1529: const out = [];
...
L2054: function claudeProjectsRoot() {
L2055: const override = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECTS_ROOT;
L2056: if (override && override.length > 0) {
```

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/scripts/postinstall.js>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: // Copy the bundled Claude Code skill into ~/.claude/skills/active-work/ and the
L2: // /aw-prompt slash command into ~/.claude/commands/ when ~/.claude exists. Skip
L3: // silently otherwise. Fail-soft: never abort an npm install if a copy fails.
L4: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, cpSync, copyFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
L5: import { join, dirname } from 'node:path';
...
L12: const commandSource = join(__dirname, '..', 'claude-commands', 'aw-prompt.md');
L13: const claudeDir = join(homedir(), '.claude');
L14: const claudeSkillsDir = join(claudeDir, 'skills', 'active-work');
...
L29: }
L30: mkdirSync(claudeSkillsDir, { recursive: true });
L31: cpSync(skillSource, claudeSkillsDir, { recursive: true });
L32: console.log(`active-work: installed Claude Code skill to ${claudeSkillsDi
```

### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/dist/cli.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js
L132: }
L133: const cwd = path.resolve(process.cwd());
L134: if (isInside(cwd, from)) {
...
L908: frontmatter: raw.frontmatter,
L909: body: raw.body,
L910: prefix
...
L1527: }
L1528: function parseWorktreePorcelain(stdout) {
L1529: const out = [];
...
L2054: function claudeProjectsRoot() {
L2055: const override = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECTS_ROOT;
L2056: if (override && override.length > 0) {
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-MUY3J4OM.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/dist/chunk-MUY3J4OM.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 2
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/dist/cli.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = token_shingles
matchedPackage = @titan-design/active-work@0.4.0
matchedPath = dist/cli.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.4.0
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 48
summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source
```

### 15. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/aw.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@titan-design/active-work@0.8.0/dist/aw.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @titan-design/active-work@0.7.0
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.7.0
similarity = 0.667
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, preuninstall
- **Dependencies:** 22
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 20
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 22

### Published dependency entries
- @clack/prompts ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hono/node-server ^2.0.2 (Dependency)
- @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/cluster ^0.1.0 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/daemon ^0.1.2 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/locator ^0.2.0 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/registry ^0.1.0 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/retrieval 0.2.0 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/session-graph ^0.3.2 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/session-read ^0.2.1 (Dependency)
- @titan-design/store-sqlite ^0.2.0 (Dependency)
- better-sqlite3 ^13.0.2 (Dependency)
- commander ^14.0.3 (Dependency)
- env-paths ^4.0.0 (Dependency)
- gray-matter ^4.0.3 (Dependency)
- hono ^4.12.18 (Dependency)
- picocolors ^1.1.1 (Dependency)
- pino ^10.3.1 (Dependency)
- pino-pretty ^13.1.3 (Dependency)
- proper-lockfile ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- yaml ^2.9.0 (Dependency)
- zod ^4.4.3 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @titan-design/active-work
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.8.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-15T15:45:51.625Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-11T10:48:38.775Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-09-30T21:33:40.597Z
- **Known versions:** 14
- **Latest version:** 0.19.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Durable workspace state for engineering work — CLI, MCP, and Claude skill for tracking initiatives across sessions
- **Author:** Henry Jewkes
- **Maintainers:** hjewkes
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22
- **Artifact files:** 19
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,127,789 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@titan-design/active-work/v/0.8.0>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/HJewkes/active-work>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/HJewkes/active-work/issues>)
