---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@todoforai/cli"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@todoforai/cli/v/0.1.55.md"
package: "@todoforai/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@todoforai/cli@0.1.55 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.1.55"
---

# @todoforai/cli@0.1.55 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 22 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** None published
- **Selected version:** 0.1.55
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

The AI recommended clean, but the final policy action is warn. This report does not record a matching static-policy override reason.

AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

No install-time or covert attack was identified. The package is a user-invoked CLI for the TODOforAI service, and the remote bridge installer runs only as part of that command when the companion binary is missing.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-23T23:35:55.037Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-23T23:37:00.126Z
- **Download time:** 771 ms
- **Static scan time:** 3858 ms
- **AI review time:** 60458 ms
- **Total time:** 65089 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No install-time or covert attack was identified. The package is a user-invoked CLI for the TODOforAI service, and the remote bridge installer runs only as part of that command when the companion binary is missing.

- **Trigger:** A user runs the published CLI for a watch-capable todo command without --no-bridge.

- **Impact:** Network use and a local companion install stay tied to the product the user launched. No unconsented credential export, agent-config hijack, or lifecycle payload was found.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-23T23:37:00.126Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The process authenticates to the configured TODOforAI API and, if todoforai-bridge is absent, runs the documented vendor installer and starts that local bridge.

- **Rationale:** There is no npm install lifecycle hook, self-install chain, or hidden exfiltration. Remote shell install of the companion bridge is gated by an explicit CLI run, logged, and pointed at the vendor host.

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Clean

- **Confidence:** 86.0%

- **Recommended action:** mark\_clean

- **Intent class:** Benign

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Final policy explanation:** The AI recommended clean, but the final policy action is warn. This report does not record a matching static-policy override reason.

- **Evidence for AI clean decision:** package.json publishes a Node CLI with bin entries only. scripts are build, prepublishOnly, start, and dev, with no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook., The bundled CLI defaults API traffic to https://api.todofor.ai and reads the caller API key from flags, TODOFORAI env, or the local todoforai credentials file., A missing companion binary is fetched only after the user runs a watch-capable command, and only when --no-bridge, --no-watch, and --isolated are not set. The installer URL is the fixed vendor host https://todofor.ai/bridge and the step is printed to stderr.

- **Evidence against:** On Linux and macOS, that user-run path executes curl of the vendor installer piped to sh and may start todoforai-bridge in the background. That is first-party setup for the stated CLI, not an install-time or hidden payload.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @todoforai/cli@0.1.55.

- Review the evidence and your use of @todoforai/cli@0.1.55 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1919: }
L1920: exec(s) {
L1921: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex;
```

### 4. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** bin/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/bin/todoforai-cli.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L9: const dist = fileURLToPath(new URL("../dist/todoforai-cli.js", import.meta.url));
L10: await import(existsSync(src) && typeof Bun !== "undefined" ? src : dist);
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L45187: // src/ensure-bridge.ts
L45188: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "child_process";
L45189: import fs2 from "fs";
...
L45191: import os2 from "os";
L45192: var INSTALLER_URL = "https://todofor.ai/bridge";
L45193: var INSTALL_PREFIX = process.env.TODOFORAI_PREFIX || path2.join(os2.homedir(), ".todoforai", "bin");
L45194: var INSTALL_TIMEOUT_MS = 90000;
```

### 10. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L45176: if (!content) {
L45177: process.stderr.write(`Error: Empty input
L45178: `);
...
L45187: // src/ensure-bridge.ts
L45188: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "child_process";
L45189: import fs2 from "fs";
...
L45191: import os2 from "os";
L45192: var INSTALLER_URL = "https://todofor.ai/bridge";
L45193: var INSTALL_PREFIX = process.env.TODOFORAI_PREFIX || path2.join(os2.homedir(), ".todoforai", "bin");
```

### 11. Critical: Browser Credential Phishing
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L309: if (lineHash.hasOwnProperty ? lineHash.hasOwnProperty(line) : lineHash[line] !== undefined) {
L310: chars += String.fromCharCode(lineHash[line]);
L311: } else {
...
L1919: }
L1920: exec(s) {
L1921: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex;
...
L2089: props: ["language", "code", "autodetect"],
L2090: data: function() {
L2091: return {
...
L2287: deprecated("10.7.0", `Please use highlight(code, options) instead.
L2288: https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/2277`);
L2289: languageName = codeOrlanguageName;
```

### 12. Critical: Download Execute
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L309: if (lineHash.hasOwnProperty ? lineHash.hasOwnProperty(line) : lineHash[line] !== undefined) {
L310: chars += String.fromCharCode(lineHash[line]);
L311: } else {
...
L1919: }
L1920: exec(s) {
L1921: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex;
...
L2089: props: ["language", "code", "autodetect"],
L2090: data: function() {
L2091: return {
...
L2287: deprecated("10.7.0", `Please use highlight(code, options) instead.
L2288: https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/2277`);
L2289: languageName = codeOrlanguageName;
```

### 13. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L309: if (lineHash.hasOwnProperty ? lineHash.hasOwnProperty(line) : lineHash[line] !== undefined) {
L310: chars += String.fromCharCode(lineHash[line]);
L311: } else {
...
L1919: }
L1920: exec(s) {
L1921: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex;
...
L2089: props: ["language", "code", "autodetect"],
L2090: data: function() {
L2091: return {
...
L2287: deprecated("10.7.0", `Please use highlight(code, options) instead.
L2288: https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/2277`);
L2289: languageName = codeOrlanguageName;
```

### 14. High: Remote Agent Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L26587: keyword: "and case default else elsif false if in import enherits node or true undef unless main settings $string ",
L26588: literal: "alias audit before loglevel noop require subscribe tag " + "owner ensure group mode name|0 changes context force incl lens load_path onlyif provider returns root show_dif...
L26589: built_in: "architecture augeasversion blockdevices boardmanufacturer boardproductname boardserialnumber cfkey dhcp_servers " + "domain ec2_ ec2_userdata facterversion filesystems l...
...
L42712: try {
L42713: cache = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(cacheFile, "utf8"));
L42714: } catch {}
...
L45187: // src/ensure-bridge.ts
L45188: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "child_process";
L45189: import fs2 from "fs";
```

### 15. Critical: Remote Response Code Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L309: if (lineHash.hasOwnProperty ? lineHash.hasOwnProperty(line) : lineHash[line] !== undefined) {
L310: chars += String.fromCharCode(lineHash[line]);
L311: } else {
...
L1919: }
L1920: exec(s) {
L1921: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex;
...
L2089: props: ["language", "code", "autodetect"],
L2090: data: function() {
L2091: return {
...
L2287: deprecated("10.7.0", `Please use highlight(code, options) instead.
L2288: https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js/issues/2277`);
L2289: languageName = codeOrlanguageName;
```

### 16. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 17. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 18. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 19. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 20. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @todoforai/cli@0.1.50
matchedPath = dist/todoforai-cli.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHRvZG9mb3JhaS9jbGk:0.1.50
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 22. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/todoforai-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@todoforai/cli@0.1.55/dist/todoforai-cli.js>)

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = 795061d6fefb86fb
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = @todoforai/cli@0.1.50
matchedPath = dist/todoforai-cli.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHRvZG9mb3JhaS9jbGk:0.1.50
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 2
summary = package final verdict is malicious
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 6
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 2
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 6

### Published dependency entries
- @agentclientprotocol/sdk ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @todoforai/update-notifier ^0.1.0 (Dependency)
- chalk ^6.0.0 (Dependency)
- cli-highlight ^2.1.11 (Dependency)
- diff-match-patch ^1.0.5 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.18.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @todoforai/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.55
- **Version published:** 2026-09-23T16:44:49.202Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T09:42:33.661Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-07T23:17:59.572Z
- **Known versions:** 29
- **Latest version:** 0.1.65
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** CLI for \[TODOforAI\](https://todofor.ai) — create, watch, and inspect AI-powered todos.
- **Maintainers:** sixzero-tmp, sixzero
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 4
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,825,283 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@todoforai/cli/v/0.1.55>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/todoforai/cli>)
- [Homepage](<https://todofor.ai/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/todoforai/cli/issues>)
