registry / @togglhq/cli / 1.13.24
@togglhq/cli@1.13.24
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged runtime behavior resolves to normal Toggl OAuth, browser launching, and explicit agent skill setup. No unconsented credential transfer, command-output exfiltration, or install-time mutation was established.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
The CLI runs when a user invokes it; agent skill installation requires an explicit command.
Impact
No harmful effect was established by the inspected behavior.
Mechanism
The inspected OAuth flow uses Toggl Accounts by default, while agent skill setup delegates to a prompted installer.
AI rationale
The flagged runtime behavior resolves to normal Toggl OAuth, browser launching, and explicit agent skill setup. No unconsented credential transfer, command-output exfiltration, or install-time mutation was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 95.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json routes the toggl executable to build/cli.js.
- The Accounts URL defaults to Toggl production; alternate URLs must come from explicit options or an environment setting.
- The manual OAuth flow asks the user to sign in through the generated link and paste an authorization code.
- Agent skill installation is an explicit CLI command; the skills tool prompts before installation and targets selected agent directories.
- The inspected Sentry files expose observability integrations and a Fastify tracing symbol.
- The inspected manifests show ordinary package entrypoints and scripts, with no install lifecycle hook in either package.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedbuild/program-BgzwC8dF.jsView file
6import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L7: import { exec, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L8: import process$1 from "node:process";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
build/program-BgzwC8dF.jsView on unpkg · L61830if (process$3.versions?.electron) parseOptions.from = "electron";
L1831: const execArgv = process$3.execArgv ?? [];
L1832: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) parseOptions.from = "eval";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
build/program-BgzwC8dF.js:
import * as readline from "node:readline";
import { mkdir, readFile, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
function readline$1() {
const cleanFn = cb(readline$1());
* Returns the width of the active readline, or 80 as default value.
function readlineWidth() {
output: readline$1().output
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processbuild/program-BgzwC8dF.js
HighShellbuild/program-BgzwC8dF.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencebuild/program-BgzwC8dF.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-BgzwC8dF.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-BgzwC8dF.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.24.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.24 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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