registry / @togglhq/cli / 1.13.39
@togglhq/cli@1.13.39
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe executable entrypoint invokes the CLI, and the inspected authentication flow defaults to Toggl’s services. The scanner’s agent-file and command execution signals do not establish an automatic attack or unauthorized data transfer.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Running the Toggl CLI or separately invoking the skills CLI installation operation.
Impact
No unauthorized credential transfer, command-output exfiltration, or automatic agent configuration change was established.
Mechanism
The inspected login flow uses Toggl service defaults, while the agent-related code writes skill files when its install function runs.
AI rationale
The executable entrypoint invokes the CLI, and the inspected authentication flow defaults to Toggl’s services. The scanner’s agent-file and command execution signals do not establish an automatic attack or unauthorized data transfer.
Network endpoints2
accounts.toggl.comfocus.toggl.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes the CLI and library entrypoints and declares no install lifecycle hook.
- Authentication defaults to Toggl’s accounts and focus services; the login flow obtains an authorization code and exchanges it with the configured accounts service.
- The agent-related source writes skill files only when its install function is invoked; the dependency manifest exposes a separate CLI entrypoint.
- The inspected dependencies identify as Sentry’s Node SDK and the skills CLI package; their cited entrypoints and manifests show ordinary package exports.
- The Fastify tracing constants file exports an OpenTelemetry active-span symbol.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedbuild/program-Ck6T2Lm4.jsView file
6import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L7: import { exec, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L8: import process$1 from "node:process";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
build/program-Ck6T2Lm4.jsView on unpkg · L61830if (process$3.versions?.electron) parseOptions.from = "electron";
L1831: const execArgv = process$3.execArgv ?? [];
L1832: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) parseOptions.from = "eval";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
build/program-Ck6T2Lm4.js:
import * as readline from "node:readline";
import { mkdir, readFile, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
function readline$1() {
const cleanFn = cb(readline$1());
* Returns the width of the active readline, or 80 as default value.
function readlineWidth() {
output: readline$1().output
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processbuild/program-Ck6T2Lm4.js
HighShellbuild/program-Ck6T2Lm4.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencebuild/program-Ck6T2Lm4.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-Ck6T2Lm4.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-Ck6T2Lm4.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.39.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.39 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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