registry / @togglhq/cli / 1.13.42
@togglhq/cli@1.13.42
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install hook or confirmed attack behavior. The scanner’s process and credential signals correspond to CLI command handling, explicit skill setup, and API requests to the configured Toggl service.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Running the CLI or explicitly invoking its skill setup command.
Impact
No confirmed credential theft, command-output exfiltration, or unconsented agent configuration change was established.
Mechanism
The CLI parses the requested command; skill setup invokes the bundled skills installer to install packaged skill files.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no install hook or confirmed attack behavior. The scanner’s process and credential signals correspond to CLI command handling, explicit skill setup, and API requests to the configured Toggl service.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes the CLI and program modules; its scripts contain no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI initializes telemetry and dispatches user-supplied arguments through the command parser.
- The API defaults to Toggl’s Focus and Accounts services; alternate URLs come from explicit options or environment settings.
- API-token mode sends the token to the configured Focus API for the user settings request.
- Agent skill installation is an explicit CLI command that invokes the skills installer for packaged skill files.
- The inspected dependencies expose Sentry integrations and a skills CLI; the flagged Fastify constant only defines an OpenTelemetry span symbol.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedbuild/program-F7pyW0m_.jsView file
6import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L7: import { exec, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L8: import process$1 from "node:process";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
build/program-F7pyW0m_.jsView on unpkg · L61830if (process$3.versions?.electron) parseOptions.from = "electron";
L1831: const execArgv = process$3.execArgv ?? [];
L1832: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) parseOptions.from = "eval";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
build/program-F7pyW0m_.js:
import * as readline from "node:readline";
import { mkdir, readFile, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
function readline$1() {
const cleanFn = cb(readline$1());
* Returns the width of the active readline, or 80 as default value.
function readlineWidth() {
output: readline$1().output
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processbuild/program-F7pyW0m_.js
HighShellbuild/program-F7pyW0m_.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencebuild/program-F7pyW0m_.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-F7pyW0m_.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-F7pyW0m_.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.42.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.42 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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