registry / @togglhq/cli / 1.13.44
@togglhq/cli@1.13.44
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s network, credential, and process signals are consistent with the CLI’s OAuth and user-facing command behavior. Source inspection found no concrete attack path or install-time agent mutation.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs the CLI authentication flow; the package manifest has no install lifecycle hook.
Impact
No confirmed credential theft, command-output exfiltration, or unconsented agent configuration change was established.
Mechanism
The CLI defaults to Toggl’s production accounts URL and sends the OAuth code exchange to the configured URL. The agent integration excerpt writes skill files as part of a skill installation operation.
AI rationale
The scanner’s network, credential, and process signals are consistent with the CLI’s OAuth and user-facing command behavior. Source inspection found no concrete attack path or install-time agent mutation.
Network endpoints1
accounts.toggl.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json declares the CLI entry point and lists no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI defaults its accounts API to Toggl’s production service.
- OAuth token exchange posts to the configured accounts API URL; the staging client is selected only when that exact staging URL is configured.
- The inspected agent integration code writes skill files during a skill installation operation; no install-time trigger is shown.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedbuild/program-DHi8hJEg.jsView file
6import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L7: import { exec, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L8: import process$1 from "node:process";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
build/program-DHi8hJEg.jsView on unpkg · L61830if (process$3.versions?.electron) parseOptions.from = "electron";
L1831: const execArgv = process$3.execArgv ?? [];
L1832: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) parseOptions.from = "eval";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
build/program-DHi8hJEg.js:
import * as readline from "node:readline";
import { mkdir, readFile, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
function readline$1() {
const cleanFn = cb(readline$1());
* Returns the width of the active readline, or 80 as default value.
function readlineWidth() {
output: readline$1().output
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processbuild/program-DHi8hJEg.js
HighShellbuild/program-DHi8hJEg.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencebuild/program-DHi8hJEg.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-DHi8hJEg.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-DHi8hJEg.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.44.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.44 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.