registry / @togglhq/cli / 1.13.47
@togglhq/cli@1.13.47
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest exposes the CLI without an install hook, and inspected source supports the scanner findings as product behavior rather than a concrete attack. The skill installation file writes are part of an invoked setup operation.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Normal CLI use; skill file writes occur when the skill installation command is invoked.
Impact
No confirmed malicious effect or attack surface was established.
Mechanism
Authentication uses the configured Toggl Accounts URL, which defaults to the production endpoint. Skill files are written during the selected installation operation.
AI rationale
The manifest exposes the CLI without an install hook, and inspected source supports the scanner findings as product behavior rather than a concrete attack. The skill installation file writes are part of an invoked setup operation.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes the CLI and library entrypoints and declares no install lifecycle hook.
- The account API URL defaults to the production URL and can be changed through caller options or environment variables.
- The flagged skill installer writes selected skill files as part of its install operation.
- The inspected dependency manifests and entrypoints identify the required Sentry SDK and skills CLI sources.
Evidence against
- The inspected source did not establish credential forwarding to an unrelated fixed gateway or command-output exfiltration.
- The agent skill installation is user-invoked; the cited file-write path is part of installing the selected skill.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedbuild/program-DCtDkzB1.jsView file
6import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L7: import { exec, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L8: import process$1 from "node:process";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
build/program-DCtDkzB1.jsView on unpkg · L61830if (process$3.versions?.electron) parseOptions.from = "electron";
L1831: const execArgv = process$3.execArgv ?? [];
L1832: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) parseOptions.from = "eval";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
build/program-DCtDkzB1.js:
import * as readline from "node:readline";
import { mkdir, readFile, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
function readline$1() {
const cleanFn = cb(readline$1());
* Returns the width of the active readline, or 80 as default value.
function readlineWidth() {
output: readline$1().output
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processbuild/program-DCtDkzB1.js
HighShellbuild/program-DCtDkzB1.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencebuild/program-DCtDkzB1.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-DCtDkzB1.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-DCtDkzB1.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.47.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.47 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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