@togglhq/cli@1.13.57
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe OAuth and workspace flows send credentials to the configured accounts service, whose default is Toggl; callers can supply service URL overrides. The inspected subprocesses do not capture command output, and no hidden recipient or attack path was identified.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI and lists build and development scripts, with no install lifecycle hook.
- The login flow obtains an OAuth authorization code, exchanges it, then uses the resulting token for account and workspace requests. The destination defaults to Toggl services and can be selected through caller options, environment settings, or a saved profile.
- The inspected subprocess calls inherit standard I/O; the source shows no command-output collection or outbound transfer path.
- The inspected dependency excerpts cover prompt handling, Sentry and OpenTelemetry exports, and the skills CLI; they show no credential-transfer behavior.
- The package contains network requests and subprocess execution, but the inspected subprocesses inherit standard I/O and the credential requests use the configured accounts service.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
build/program-Nzh9v81h.jsView on unpkg · L6Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.57.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.57 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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