@togglhq/cli@1.13.78
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner's credential-redirection claim is not supported by the inspected source, but the OAuth browser opener uses shell interpolation on an environment-configurable URL. This warrants a warning for conditional remote code execution risk, not a malware block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI supports an Accounts URL override, and its authentication flow uses that URL to build the login link.
- Interactive OAuth sign-in passes the generated login link to a browser opener.
- The browser opener interpolates that link into a shell command without escaping it.
- The default Accounts host is Toggl's service; the staging host selects a staging OAuth client.
- The inspected source does not establish a fixed unofficial credential gateway or command-output exfiltration.
- The shell injection requires a crafted Accounts URL configuration and a user-invoked interactive sign-in.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
build/program-loLC8qgy.jsView on unpkg · L6Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.78.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.78 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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