registry / @togglhq/cli / 1.13.83
@togglhq/cli@1.13.83
Toggl CLI for Toggl 2.0 API operations.
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install hook, and the inspected runtime paths support ordinary Toggl authentication and user-invoked CLI updates. The reported static signals do not establish an attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Running the CLI; subprocess creation occurs only when the user invokes self-update.
Impact
No confirmed credential theft, command-output exfiltration, or other attack surface was established by the inspected source.
Mechanism
The CLI sends API credentials to its configured Toggl accounts service. Self-update runs the selected package-manager command with inherited terminal I/O.
AI rationale
The manifest has no install hook, and the inspected runtime paths support ordinary Toggl authentication and user-invoked CLI updates. The reported static signals do not establish an attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes the CLI and library entrypoints, with no install lifecycle hook.
- The bundle defaults Toggl account and Focus requests to Toggl services and permits explicit URL configuration.
- API token mode reads the Toggl token environment variable; OAuth exchanges authorization codes with the configured accounts API.
- The flagged subprocess call is the explicit self-update path and inherits terminal I/O; the inspected excerpt shows no command-output upload.
- The cited @sentry/node files expose OpenTelemetry integrations, and the cited skills files are its CLI implementation and dependencies.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedbuild/program-DnSZrjLi.jsView file
6import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L7: import { exec, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L8: import process$1 from "node:process";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
build/program-DnSZrjLi.jsView on unpkg · L61830if (process$3.versions?.electron) parseOptions.from = "electron";
L1831: const execArgv = process$3.execArgv ?? [];
L1832: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) parseOptions.from = "eval";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
build/program-DnSZrjLi.js:
import * as readline from "node:readline";
import { mkdir, readFile, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
function readline$1() {
const cleanFn = cb(readline$1());
* Returns the width of the active readline, or 80 as default value.
function readlineWidth() {
output: readline$1().output
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processbuild/program-DnSZrjLi.js
HighShellbuild/program-DnSZrjLi.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencebuild/program-DnSZrjLi.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-DnSZrjLi.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbuild/program-DnSZrjLi.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @togglhq/cli@1.13.83.
See all versions of @togglhq/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @togglhq/cli@1.13.83 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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