@trayai/helix-cli@1.13.1
Helix CLI — helix init, helix dev, helix auth
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package does not show automatic credential theft, but its agent-facing MCP server exposes a credential-backed request tool with a caller-supplied destination and no visible per-call confirmation. This is a meaningful risk if an agent invokes the tool toward an unintended host; the source does not reveal whether the broker limits destinations.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The MCP tool accepts a configured authentication and a caller-supplied HTTPS URL; its description says the broker injects the real credentials server-side.
- The implementation uses the local Tray login, resolves the selected authentication, and forwards the supplied URL and request data to the broker.
- The MCP server is started by the explicit `helix mcp` command, exposing this credential-forwarding tool to connected agents.
- The manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- The tool is presented as a way to test credentials and probe an upstream API, consistent with the CLI’s developer tooling purpose.
- The CLI telemetry schema contains event, runtime, locale, timezone, and project fields, not credentials, file contents, or command output.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @trayai/helix-cli@1.13.1.
See all versions of @trayai/helix-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @trayai/helix-cli@1.13.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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