@trycodev/cli@0.11.0
Secure CoDev cloud coding-agent authentication CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe mirror’s prompt promises secret redaction, but the inspected upload path sends transcript lines as-is, and non-interactive setup defaults the mirror on. This creates a meaningful risk that sensitive content is sent despite the stated protection; the source does not prove that credentials are present in the uploaded lines.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The mirror prompt says prompts, replies and tool output go to CoDev, with secrets redacted.
- When setup is non-interactive, mirror consent falls back to the saved setting, which defaults to enabled.
- The uploader sends transcript lines in its upload body without visible redaction in this path.
- Uploads go to `/api/cli/native-sessions` with the saved CoDev bearer token.
- The mirror prompt discloses that chat content is sent to CoDev and offers an off choice.
- A session is linked only after a CoDev tool call names a workspace.
- Codex and Claude credentials are sent through explicit auth commands to the configured CoDev API.
Source & flagged code
14 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
src/mirror-upload.mjsView on unpkg · L1Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
src/mirror-upload.mjsView on unpkgThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @trycodev/cli@0.11.0.
See all versions of @trycodev/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @trycodev/cli@0.11.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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