registry / @trycodev/cli / 0.3.1
@trycodev/cli@0.3.1
Secure CoDev cloud coding-agent authentication CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source shows no install hook or unconsented agent configuration mutation. Credential transfer occurs through explicit authentication commands to the configured CoDev API, and the reviewed agent configuration path supports user-directed setup.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The user runs an authentication command or adds the printed coordination hook settings to an agent configuration.
Impact
Provider credentials are shared with the CoDev service for account linking, and configured hooks report coordination data to that service.
Mechanism
The CLI reads provider credentials for explicit login flows and sends them to the CoDev API; coordination hook settings are printed for user setup.
AI rationale
The source shows no install hook or unconsented agent configuration mutation. Credential transfer occurs through explicit authentication commands to the configured CoDev API, and the reviewed agent configuration path supports user-directed setup.
Evidence
package.jsonsrc/client.mjsbin/codev.mjssrc/coordinate.mjs
Network endpoints1
www.trycodev.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 89.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes a CLI and lists only test and typecheck scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The agent configuration target reads Cursor auth files from the temporary home used by the explicit cursor-auth command.
- The credential caller is an explicit codex-auth command, and the inspected source posts the resulting auth cache to the CoDev API.
- The inspected coordination code prints hook settings for the user to add; no unconsented agent configuration write was identified.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
UrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedsrc/coordinate.mjsView file
1import { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
High
src/client.mjsView file
10Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L10: import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
L11: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12:
L13: const DEFAULT_API_URL = "https://www.trycodev.com";
L14:
L15: export function configPath(environment = process.env) {
L16: return join(
L17: environment.CODEV_CONFIG_DIR || join(homedir(), ".codev"),
L18: "config.json",
...
L27: const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}${path}`, options);
L28: const payload = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
L29: if (!response.ok && response.status !== 202) {
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
src/client.mjsView on unpkg · L10Findings
1 Critical2 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationsrc/client.mjs
HighChild Processsrc/coordinate.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executionsrc/client.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
LowAi Review Evidencesrc/client.mjs
LowAi Review Evidencesrc/client.mjs
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @trycodev/cli@0.3.1.
See all versions of @trycodev/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @trycodev/cli@0.3.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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