@trycodev/cli@0.3.3
Secure CoDev cloud coding-agent authentication CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe default endpoint and explicit auth commands fit the stated integration, so the source does not establish a malicious default transfer. The unrestricted endpoint override leaves a concrete conditional credential-exposure risk, warranting a warning.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs a provider auth command after configuring the CLI endpoint.
Impact
If the endpoint is set to an unrelated recipient, provider credentials and the CLI token may be exposed there.
Mechanism
The CLI POSTs provider credential data and adds its saved bearer token to requests sent to the saved API URL.
AI rationale
The default endpoint and explicit auth commands fit the stated integration, so the source does not establish a malicious default transfer. The unrestricted endpoint override leaves a concrete conditional credential-exposure risk, warranting a warning.
Evidence
src/client.mjsbin/codev.mjs
Network endpoints1
www.trycodev.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 89.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The API endpoint uses CODEV_API_URL when set, with the CoDev service as its default.
- Login saves the selected API URL, and authenticated requests send the saved bearer token to it.
- The Codex, Claude, and Cursor auth commands send provider credential data to that API.
- The CLI exposes these transfers through explicit auth commands.
- Cursor credentials are read from temporary-home auth files after running the Cursor login command.
Evidence against
- The default recipient is the package-aligned CoDev service, and the credential transfers require explicit auth commands.
- The cited Cursor auth-file paths are confined to the temporary home used for its login flow.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
UrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedsrc/coordinate-git.mjsView file
1import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
src/coordinate-git.mjsView on unpkg · L1src/client.mjsView file
10Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L10: import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
L11: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12:
L13: const DEFAULT_API_URL = "https://www.trycodev.com";
L14:
L15: export function configPath(environment = process.env) {
L16: return join(
L17: environment.CODEV_CONFIG_DIR || join(homedir(), ".codev"),
L18: "config.json",
...
L27: const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}${path}`, options);
L28: const payload = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
L29: if (!response.ok && response.status !== 202) {
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
src/client.mjsView on unpkg · L10Findings
1 Critical2 High5 Medium4 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationsrc/client.mjs
HighChild Processsrc/coordinate-git.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executionsrc/client.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumAi Review Evidencesrc/client.mjs
MediumAi Review Evidencesrc/client.mjs
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @trycodev/cli@0.3.3.
See all versions of @trycodev/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @trycodev/cli@0.3.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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