@trypattern/sdk@0.1.32
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe install and runtime download-execute hints do not establish an attack: source download, dependency installation, and setup occur through an explicit pull command. The generated instruction to publish without asking creates a residual agent capability risk, so warn rather than block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a CLI and lists development scripts; no install lifecycle hook is present.
- The CLI describes its global launcher shim, and its implementation refuses to overwrite an unrecognized existing shim.
- Pull downloads a named app’s source and runs dependency installation and setup as part of that command.
- For a newly pulled starter, the CLI prints instructions telling an agent to publish its first change without asking.
- The publish instruction is emitted after the explicit pull command; inspected code does not publish automatically at install or import time.
- The shim setup is described as an explicit setup command and checks for an existing unrecognized file before writing.
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/cli/publishing.jsView on unpkg · L1Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/cli/publishing.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @trypattern/sdk@0.1.32.
See all versions of @trypattern/sdk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @trypattern/sdk@0.1.32 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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