@tscircuit/runframe@0.0.3073
[tscircuit](https://github.com/tscircuit/tscircuit) ⋅ [View Examples](https://runframe.vercel.app)
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s hardcoded-exfiltration label is not supported as a confirmed attack: the token transfer follows user sign-in and goes to the run-frame’s configurable file-server API. Because that destination is not validated in the inspected source, warn about conditional credential exposure without blocking publication.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes the browser preview and runner entry points.
- The credential transfer follows the Sign In button and completes a registry login-page exchange.
- The resulting registry token is sent in a TOKEN_UPDATED event.
- That event is posted to a file-server API whose destination can be set by the host page; its default path is /api.
- Separate PostHog telemetry uses the tscircuit-hosted collector and records run-frame identity and activity properties.
- The token transfer follows an explicit sign-in action and supports the CLI run-frame flow.
- The source does not establish that the configurable file-server endpoint is package-controlled or unrelated to the host application.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedSource sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/chunk-6VJVXFEL.jsView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/chunk-6VJVXFEL.jsView on unpkg · L3725Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tscircuit/runframe@0.0.3073.
See all versions of @tscircuit/runframe for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tscircuit/runframe@0.0.3073 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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