@tsuga/cli@1.103.0
Tsuga CLI - manage resources from the command line
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is opt-in runtime telemetry, not evidence of malware or credential exfiltration. Because it can include raw command-line option values while the prompt only describes sending usage data, warn that entered query or filter text may be included.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A user accepts the telemetry prompt, previously enabled telemetry, or explicitly sets TSUGA_TELEMETRY=1 or true.
Impact
Option values may reveal user-entered query or filter text to the Tsuga API; no credential theft or command-output collection was identified.
Mechanism
After a CLI run, the package records arguments from the first flag onward and sends a detached POST to the Tsuga CLI run endpoint.
AI rationale
This is opt-in runtime telemetry, not evidence of malware or credential exfiltration. Because it can include raw command-line option values while the prompt only describes sending usage data, warn that entered query or filter text may be included.
Evidence
dist/cli.js
Network endpoints2
api.tsuga.com/v1/cli-runsapi.tsuga-staging.com/v1/cli-runs
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The run telemetry schema includes command-line arguments from the first flag onward, including their values; its example includes a query value.
- The CLI starts a detached POST that sends the telemetry payload to its resolved API base.
- The run-record endpoint is /v1/cli-runs; the source lists api.tsuga.com and api.tsuga-staging.com as accepted API hosts.
Evidence against
- The manifest has no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- Telemetry sending is gated by stored consent, an interactive prompt after a successful run, or the explicit TSUGA_TELEMETRY opt-in.
- The recorded run fields include command name, duration, outcome, platform, Node version, and spans; no credential collection or command-output transmission was identified.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation
Source & flagged code
18 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
273patternName = github_pat
severity = critical
line = 273
Critical
273patternName = github_pat
severity = critical
line = 273
Critical
273patternName = github_oauth
severity = critical
line = 273
Critical
273patternName = github_server_token
severity = critical
line = 273
Critical
Secret Pattern
GitHub server-to-server token in dist/cli.js
dist/cli.jsFindings
9 Critical9 High2 Medium4 Low
CriticalCritical Secretdist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tsuga/cli@1.103.0.
See all versions of @tsuga/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tsuga/cli@1.103.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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