@tsuga/cli@1.86.0
Tsuga CLI - manage resources from the command line
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s process and network signals correspond to a telemetry sender gated by consent, with destinations restricted to Tsuga API hosts or localhost. The manifest shows no install hook, and the inspected source did not establish a concrete attack surface.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest points the CLI command to dist/cli.js and lists build, test, and type-check scripts without an install hook.
- The telemetry sender checks saved consent first; otherwise it prompts on an interactive successful run, and TSUGA_TELEMETRY accepts explicit true values.
- When enabled, the CLI sends run metadata and spans to its CLI-runs endpoint. The API URL check restricts non-local destinations to HTTPS on Tsuga’s API hosts.
- The detected process execution and network request belong to this consent-gated telemetry sender.
- Telemetry includes command flags, so values supplied as flags may be included in the report when telemetry is enabled.
Source & flagged code
16 flaggedFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tsuga/cli@1.86.0.
See all versions of @tsuga/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tsuga/cli@1.86.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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