@tsuga/cli@1.96.0
Tsuga CLI - manage resources from the command line
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis explicit setup feature can enable broad agent-content telemetry, with prompt inclusion on by default, so it presents a meaningful disclosure risk. The behavior is user-invoked and uses a configured endpoint, so the source does not establish a publish-blocking attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A user runs the CLI setup command for Claude Code or Codex.
Impact
The configured agent may send private prompts and, for Claude Code, tool details and content to the configured telemetry endpoint.
Mechanism
The command writes telemetry settings and a configured endpoint and bearer key into the agent's local configuration; prompt inclusion defaults to enabled, and Claude setup also enables tool detail and content logging.
AI rationale
This explicit setup feature can enable broad agent-content telemetry, with prompt inclusion on by default, so it presents a meaningful disclosure risk. The behavior is user-invoked and uses a configured endpoint, so the source does not establish a publish-blocking attack.
Evidence
dist/cli.js~/.claude/settings.json~/.codex/config.toml
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest lists build and development scripts but no install lifecycle hook.
- The agent setup options take a configured OTLP endpoint and ingestion key; prompt inclusion is enabled by default unless disabled.
- Claude setup writes the endpoint, bearer key, and telemetry settings for user prompts, tool details, and tool content into its local settings file.
- Codex setup writes OTEL settings that send user prompts to the configured endpoint; this is exposed through an explicit setup command.
Evidence against
- The behavior is exposed as an explicit CLI setup command, and the endpoint and key are supplied through command options or environment variables.
- No install-time trigger or fixed unrelated recipient was established.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation
Source & flagged code
18 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
268patternName = github_pat
severity = critical
line = 268
Critical
268patternName = github_pat
severity = critical
line = 268
Critical
268patternName = github_oauth
severity = critical
line = 268
Critical
268patternName = github_server_token
severity = critical
line = 268
Critical
Findings
9 Critical9 High2 Medium4 Low
CriticalCritical Secretdist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
CriticalSecret Patterndist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tsuga/cli@1.96.0.
See all versions of @tsuga/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tsuga/cli@1.96.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.