@tyroneross/bookmark@0.3.2
Context snapshots for agent sessions, compactions, and terminal workflows
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall mutation of global Claude Code settings and instructions creates an unconsented agent control surface. This meets the policy for blocking lifecycle-driven AI-agent control-surface abuse.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs the setup script automatically from its postinstall hook.
- Postinstall setup configures global Claude Code hooks and also modifies a detected project.
- The global hook configuration writes into the user's Claude settings and appends package commands for session events.
- The automatic setup also injects instructions into the global Claude instruction file.
- Setup skips in CI or when BOOKMARK_SKIP_SETUP is true, and the hook merger preserves other hooks.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgpackage.json runs the setup script automatically from its postinstall hook.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L42Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tyroneross/bookmark@0.3.2.
See all versions of @tyroneross/bookmark for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @tyroneross/bookmark@0.3.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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