@ubnt/cawcut@0.6.0
CawCut developer CLI — auth, generate, app run, task status
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe global postinstall can automatically add package-owned skills to agent skill directories, creating a real extension lifecycle risk. The behavior is scoped and has skip conditions, with no inspected evidence of a concrete attack; downgrade to a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs a postinstall script that enters the package’s setup routine.
- On global installs, the routine installs named package skills for the default editor agents without an interactive confirmation.
- The installer targets global skill directories and defaults to the package’s GitHub skills repository.
- This is a first-party agent skill setup that can change the instructions available to installed agents; the source does not establish malicious payload behavior.
- The setup skips CI and supports an explicit skip variable, and it does not run for local installs.
- The installation is scoped to named skills and the listed agents, rather than broad agent configuration changes.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ubnt/cawcut@0.6.0.
See all versions of @ubnt/cawcut for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ubnt/cawcut@0.6.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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