registry  /  @usesuperflow/toolbar  /  1.0.169

@usesuperflow/toolbar@1.0.169

AI Security Review

scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a browser toolbar web component that loads Velt/Superflow/Firebase resources and communicates with product APIs when embedded on a page.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Browser page imports/loads superflow.js or superflow.min.js and initializes the toolbar with an API key.
Impact
Runtime network/storage access expected for a collaboration/review toolbar; no install-time compromise or covert exfiltration identified.
Mechanism
Product-aligned browser toolbar SDK loading and API calls
Rationale
Source inspection shows a bundled browser toolbar with expected Superflow/Velt/Firebase network and storage behavior, but no lifecycle hooks, filesystem access, shell execution, persistence outside browser state, or credential harvesting. Scanner signals are explained by product-aligned client API calls, bundled Firebase defaults handling, and public client constants.
Evidence
package.jsonsuperflow.jssuperflow.min.js
Network endpoints6
cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@veltdev/sdk@.../velt.jsus-central1-snipply-sdk-staging.cloudfunctions.net/getprivatenpmpackagefileapp.usesuperflow.com/api.velt.dev/saapi.velt.dev/v2/sf/tbfirebasestorage.googleapis.com/

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • superflow.js dynamically injects Velt SDK script from cdn.jsdelivr.net or Velt staging Cloud Function at runtime.
  • superflow.js contains browser storage/cookie/env references from bundled Firebase/Superflow client logic.
  • superflow.js stores toolbar/session state in localStorage/sessionStorage and exposes window.Superflow API.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hook and main is superflow.js.
  • No child_process, fs writes, shell execution, native binary loading, or package-code install-time execution found.
  • Network endpoints are aligned with Superflow/Velt/Firebase toolbar functionality.
  • Static secret hit appears to be bundled public client constants/API keys, not credential harvesting or exfiltration.
  • superflow.min.js is a minified build of the same browser toolbar bundle.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetwork
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 2 file(s), 1.18 MB of source, external domains: apis.google.com, app.usesuperflow.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, cdn.velt.dev, drive.google.com, firebasestorage.googleapis.com, fonts.googleapis.com, join.slack.com, us-central1-snipply-sdk-staging.cloudfunctions.net, us-central1-snippyly-sdk-prod.cloudfunctions.net, www.apache.org, www.google.com, www.usesuperflow.com, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source
superflow.jsView file
1545patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 1545 matchedText = calc(${t...d=r`
High
High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

superflow.jsView on unpkg · L1545
1545patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 1545 matchedText = calc(${t...d=r`
High
Secret Pattern

Google API key in superflow.js

superflow.jsView on unpkg · L1545
superflow.min.jsView file
1545patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 1545 matchedText = calc(${t...d=a`
High
Secret Pattern

Google API key in superflow.min.js

superflow.min.jsView on unpkg · L1545

Findings

3 High2 Medium3 Low
HighHigh Secretsuperflow.js
HighSecret Patternsuperflow.js
HighSecret Patternsuperflow.min.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings