registry / @validpilot/ai-verify-mcp / 1.8.3

@validpilot/ai-verify-mcp@1.8.3

AI 编程验证平台。让 AI 代码生成结果可验证、可信赖。MCP 协议原生支持，证据驱动。

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The MCP server exposes a caller-controlled arbitrary shell-command tool and arbitrary project-file modification tool. Its HTTP mode accepts tool calls without an API key unless the operator configures one.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

An MCP client invokes `atl_fix` with `fixType: "command"` and `dryRun: false`, or reaches an unauthenticated HTTP MCP instance.

Impact

Commands run with the server process privileges; selected files may be overwritten or backed up.

Mechanism

Caller-supplied shell execution and filesystem mutation.

Rationale

The package is not malware by source evidence, but it provides an unguarded arbitrary-command capability to MCP callers and can be exposed through an optionally unauthenticated HTTP server. This warrants a warning rather than a publication block.

Evidence

handlers/atl.jstools/atl_fix.jsonserver.jspackage.jsoncore/redaction.js

Network endpoints1

localhost:3456/health

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

`tools/atl_fix.json` exposes a `command` repair mode and defaults `dryRun` to false.
`handlers/atl.js` passes caller-supplied `command` directly to `execSync`.
`handlers/atl.js` resolves and writes caller-selected code/config paths, including `.env` files.
`server.js` registers `atl_fix` as an OSS MCP tool.
`server.js` serves MCP calls without authentication when `MCP_API_KEY` is unset.

Evidence against

`package.json` has only `prepublishOnly`; no install-time lifecycle hook runs for consumers.
No hard-coded exfiltration endpoint or credential-upload path was found.
`core/redaction.js` redacts common credential values from captured output.
No writes to Claude, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, or MCP client configuration were found.
The repeated U+FEFF prefix in `server.js` is not a bidi control-flow payload.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 50 file(s), 1.14 MB of source, external domains: evil.com, example.com, validpilot.com, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

hands/deep_interactor.jsView file

Lines 170-210javascript

170/**

171 * 智能表单字段填充值映射

172 */

173const FIELD_VALUES = {

174 email: 'test@example.com',

175 tel: '13800138000',

176 phone: '13800138000',

177 number: '100',

178 amount: '100',

179 price: '99.99',

180 money: '100',

181 name: '测试用户',

182 username: 'testuser',

183 nickname: '测试用户',

184 company: '测试公司',

185 address: '北京市朝阳区测试路100号',

186 city: '北京',

187 province: '北京市',

188 url: 'https://example.com',

189 website: 'https://example.com',

190 password: 'test-password-placeholder',

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

hands/deep_interactor.jsView on unpkg · L190

191 date: '2026-06-29',

192 time: '10:00',

193 datetime: '2026-06-29T10:00:00',

194 search: '测试',

195 default: 'test_' + Date.now().toString(36),

196};

197

198/**

199 * 获取字段的智能填充值

200 */

201function getFieldValue(name, placeholder, type) {

202 const lower = [name, placeholder, type].filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase();

203

204 for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(FIELD_VALUES)) {

205 if (lower.includes(key)) return value;

206 }

207

208 // 根据 type 推断

209 if (type === 'email') return FIELD_VALUES.email;

210 if (type === 'tel' || type === 'phone') return FIELD_VALUES.tel;

core/win-encoding.jsView file

Lines 1-29javascript

1'use strict';

3/**

4 * Windows 终端编码修复

5 *

6 * 解决 PowerShell (GBK) 显示 Node.js UTF-8 输出时中文乱码的问题。

7 * 在脚本入口处 require 即可生效。

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

core/win-encoding.jsView on unpkg · L5

8 *

9 * 用法:

10 * require('./core/win-encoding');

server.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1try { require('dotenv').config({ quiet: true }); } catch(e) { console.warn('[ValidPilot] dotenv not loaded:', e.message); }

Critical

Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

server.jsView on unpkg · L1

2// 修复 Windows 终端中文编码

3require('./core/win-encoding');

4const fs

bin/validpilot.jsView file

Lines 1-25javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2'use strict';

4const fs = require('fs');

5const path = require('path');

6const { spawn } = require(

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

hands/deep_interactor.jsView file

190patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 190 matchedText = password...er',

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

hands/deep_interactor.jsView on unpkg · L190

core/win-encoding.jsView file

15// 切换控制台代码页为 UTF-8 L16: require('child_process').execSync('chcp 65001', { stdio: 'ignore' }); L17: } catch (_) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

core/win-encoding.jsView on unpkg · L15

5* L6: * 解决 PowerShell (GBK) 显示 Node.js UTF-8 输出时中文乱码的问题。 L7: * 在脚本入口处 require 即可生效。

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

core/win-encoding.jsView on unpkg · L5

server.jsView file

1contains invisible/control Unicode U+FEFF (zero width no-break space) <U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF><U+FEFF>

Critical

Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

server.jsView on unpkg · L1

•Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> server.js Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

server.jsView on unpkg

bin/validpilot.jsView file

5Cross-file remote execution chain: bin/validpilot.js spawns server.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L5: const path = require('path'); L6: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L7: const { validationQuickRun } = require('../hands/verification_runner'); ... L9: L10: const PKG = require('../package.json'); L11: ... L103: const resolved = path.resolve(flowPath); L104: const raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(resolved, 'utf8')); L105: ... L135: function startServer(script, extraEnv = {}) { L136: const child = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(__dirname, '..', script)], { L137: stdio: 'inherit',

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

bin/validpilot.jsView on unpkg · L5

Findings

2 Critical3 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodeserver.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityserver.js

HighChild Processcore/win-encoding.js

HighShellcore/win-encoding.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextbin/validpilot.js

MediumSecret Patternhands/deep_interactor.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEval

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

hands/deep_interactor.jsView file

Lines 170-210javascript

170/**

171 * 智能表单字段填充值映射

172 */

173const FIELD_VALUES = {

174 email: 'test@example.com',

175 tel: '13800138000',

176 phone: '13800138000',

177 number: '100',

178 amount: '100',

179 price: '99.99',

180 money: '100',

181 name: '测试用户',

182 username: 'testuser',

183 nickname: '测试用户',

184 company: '测试公司',

185 address: '北京市朝阳区测试路100号',

186 city: '北京',

187 province: '北京市',

188 url: 'https://example.com',

189 website: 'https://example.com',

190 password: 'test-password-placeholder',

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

hands/deep_interactor.jsView on unpkg · L190

191 date: '2026-06-29',

192 time: '10:00',

193 datetime: '2026-06-29T10:00:00',

194 search: '测试',

195 default: 'test_' + Date.now().toString(36),

196};

197

198/**

199 * 获取字段的智能填充值

200 */

201function getFieldValue(name, placeholder, type) {

202 const lower = [name, placeholder, type].filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase();

203

204 for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(FIELD_VALUES)) {

205 if (lower.includes(key)) return value;

206 }

207

208 // 根据 type 推断

209 if (type === 'email') return FIELD_VALUES.email;

210 if (type === 'tel' || type === 'phone') return FIELD_VALUES.tel;

core/win-encoding.jsView file

Lines 1-29javascript

1'use strict';

3/**

4 * Windows 终端编码修复

5 *

6 * 解决 PowerShell (GBK) 显示 Node.js UTF-8 输出时中文乱码的问题。

7 * 在脚本入口处 require 即可生效。

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

core/win-encoding.jsView on unpkg · L5

8 *

9 * 用法:

10 * require('./core/win-encoding');

server.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1try { require('dotenv').config({ quiet: true }); } catch(e) { console.warn('[ValidPilot] dotenv not loaded:', e.message); }

Critical

Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

server.jsView on unpkg · L1

2// 修复 Windows 终端中文编码

3require('./core/win-encoding');

4const fs

bin/validpilot.jsView file

Lines 1-25javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2'use strict';

4const fs = require('fs');

5const path = require('path');

6const { spawn } = require(