--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@vectoree/cli" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@vectoree/cli/report.md" package: "@vectoree/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@vectoree/cli@0.1.19 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.1.19" --- # @vectoree/cli@0.1.19 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse - **Selected version:** 0.1.19 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Source inspection establishes an explicit, guarded agent configuration mutation capability. The flagged execution and network primitives do not establish malicious intent or an automatic installation attack. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-04T11:31:42.252Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-04T11:33:08.351Z - **Download time:** 759 ms - **Static scan time:** 205 ms - **AI review time:** 85135 ms - **Total time:** 86099 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** An explicit CLI command can alter project agent integrations and embed a Vectoree API key. This is a guarded agent configuration capability; no confirmed malicious attack was established. - **Trigger:** Running vectoree tools snippet --write, optionally with --replace-search. - **Impact:** Changes the tools available to the agent and stores authentication for the selected MCP destination. No automatic plugin update behavior was identified. - **Evidence paths:** dist/index.js, dist/chunk-EV6ACTMY.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-04T11:33:08.351Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Merges a Vectoree HTTP MCP server into project configuration and optionally removes recognized search servers. - **Rationale:** Source inspection establishes an explicit, guarded agent configuration mutation capability. The flagged execution and network primitives do not establish malicious intent or an automatic installation attack. - **Files touched:** .cursor/mcp.json, .vscode/mcp.json, .mcp.json - **Network endpoints:** https://vectoree.ai ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The manifest has no install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency., The explicit tools snippet command enables project agent configuration writes only with --write., Configuration writes add the Vectoree MCP server; --replace-search optionally deletes matching existing search integrations., Writing configuration embeds the available Vectoree API key in the MCP authorization header., The MCP destination follows the configurable API origin, which defaults to https://vectoree.ai. - **Evidence against:** No covert installation mutation or confirmed malicious execution was identified., The flagged child processes read operating-system machine identifiers for the explicit project-link flow, rather than executing a downloaded payload. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @vectoree/cli@0.1.19. - Review the evidence and your use of @vectoree/cli@0.1.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 696 ``` ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L149: // src/device-id.ts L150: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L151: import { randomUUID } from "crypto"; ``` ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L136: if (!getGlobalFlags().json) { L137: process.stderr.write(`${message} L138: `); ... L143: import { createHash, randomBytes } from "crypto"; L144: import http from "http"; L145: import { URL as URL2 } from "url"; ... L149: // src/device-id.ts L150: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L151: import { randomUUID } from "crypto"; ``` ### 8. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L136: if (!getGlobalFlags().json) { L137: process.stderr.write(`${message} L138: `); ... L143: import { createHash, randomBytes } from "crypto"; L144: import http from "http"; L145: import { URL as URL2 } from "url"; ... L149: // src/device-id.ts L150: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L151: import { randomUUID } from "crypto"; ``` ### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 10. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 11. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() The manifest has no install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "scripts": { "build": "tsup", "dev": "tsup --watch", "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit", "test": "vitest run", "lint": "eslint ." }, "dependencies": { "@clack/prompts": "^0.11.0", "commander": "^14.0.0", "open": "^10.2.0" }, "devDepend ``` ### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The explicit tools snippet command enables project agent configuration writes only with --write. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript tools.command("snippet").option("--client ", "cursor, claude, vscode, or json").option("--write", "Write MCP config into the project", false).option("--replace-search", "Remove Tavily/Brave/Exa-style search MCP servers", false).option("--with-key", "Embed the real API key in printed JSON", false).description("Print or write Tool Hub MCP config").action( (opts) => run(() => toolsSnippetCommand(opts)) ); tools.command("search").argument("").option("--max- ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 3 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 4 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3 ### Published dependency entries - @clack/prompts ^0.11.0 (Dependency) - commander ^14.0.0 (Dependency) - open ^10.2.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @vectoree/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.1.19 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-10-02T07:27:49.199Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-17T02:30:40.537Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-31T23:31:53.054Z - **Known versions:** 8 - **Latest version:** 0.1.19 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Official Vectoree CLI — login, link, database, storage, Model Gateway, and Tool Hub - **Author:** Vectoree - **Maintainers:** cheneyszp, bluefox27 - **Keywords:** vectoree, cli, backend, database, storage, ai, model-gateway, mcp, tool-hub - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18 - **Artifact files:** 5 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 72,483 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]()