@velaro/cli@1.4.46
Velaro Workspace v20 — command-line interface for managing bots, knowledge base ingestion, MCP API keys, search indexes, and ops health.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious install chain or exfiltration behavior was found. The explicit Claude configuration mutation and npx-based agent extension are a real capability risk that warrants a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The install hook imports banner code that can update the package's user configuration file.
- The explicit mcp-key install command creates a key and writes a Velaro MCP server into Claude Code configuration.
- The installed MCP server runs through npx, creating a future agent-extension execution path.
- The postinstall hook has no network or shell execution; it only invokes the banner helper.
- The agent configuration change requires the user to run velaro mcp-key install.
- No package self-dependency, hidden payload, credential exfiltration, or reviewer-directed text was found.
- The npm install command is limited to the explicit velaro update command.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage manifest contains a dependency pinned to a remote tarball URL.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @velaro/cli@1.4.46.
See all versions of @velaro/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @velaro/cli@1.4.46 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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