@velaro/cli@1.4.54
Velaro Workspace v20 — command-line interface for managing bots, knowledge base ingestion, MCP API keys, search indexes, and ops health.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete covert install-time attack or self-reinstall chain was found. The explicit agent configuration capability is material enough to warn, but source shows it is user-invoked rather than unconsented persistence.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- An explicit MCP-key install command modifies the Claude Code configuration and registers an npx-loaded server.
- The package has a postinstall hook, although its source only invokes the package banner.
- The explicit update command runs a global npm install of this package.
- A user-invoked screenshot helper can use supplied or Key Vault credentials to sign in and upload a captured image.
- No self-dependency is declared.
- The postinstall source contains no network, shell, credential, or agent-configuration action.
- The Claude configuration write is gated behind the named `mcp-key install` CLI command.
- No eval, arbitrary shell input, or covert exfiltration path was found in the inspected sources.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage manifest contains a dependency pinned to a remote tarball URL.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @velaro/cli@1.4.54.
See all versions of @velaro/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @velaro/cli@1.4.54 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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