registry / @velliajs/discord / 1.0.4

@velliajs/discord@1.0.4

Discord Bot Libray By Valera

AI Security Review

scanned 13h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

A runtime authorization feature contacts Discord and GitHub when a caller supplies nonempty authOptions. The manifest also fetches a git-hosted dependency using an embedded credential.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

npm dependency resolution; or Client login after constructing Client with nonempty authOptions.

Impact

Exposes credentials and permits remote availability control; the mutable git dependency increases supply-chain risk.

Mechanism

embedded GitHub credentials and remote authorization allowlist

Rationale

The embedded credentials and remote login gate are concrete security risks, but source inspection found no install hook, payload execution, or confirmed credential exfiltration. The scanner's remote decode/execute claim is unsupported by the inspected source.

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/client/Client.jssrc/sharding/Shard.jssrc/sharding/ShardClientUtil.jssrc/util/DataResolver.js

Network endpoints3

discord.com/api/v10/users/@meapi.github.com/repos/${owner}/${repo}/contents/${path}github.com/navaLinh/node-ai.git

OSV Corroboration

The package presents itself as a discord.js clone (`repository` field points at the real `github.com/discordjs/discord.js.git`, README instructs `import... from '@verylinh/discord'`) but ships two installer-relevant hostile mechanisms. First, `package.json` declares a runtime dependency `sysframe` resolved from `git+https://ghp_...@github.com/navaLinh/node-ai.git` — an unpinned (no commit SHA or tag), private, author-controlled GitHub repository, using an embedded live GitHub Personal Access Token. Every `npm install` uses the shipped token to fetch the current HEAD of that private repo into the installer's `node_modules`; the author can rewrite HEAD at any time to deliver arbitrary code, including lifecycle scripts, that will execute on subsequent installs. Second, `Client.login()` invokes an undocumented `_verifyAuthorization` routine that fetches an allow-list JSON from `api.github.com/repos/Vellia-Elyvia/mydb/contents/db.json` under a hardcoded PAT and refuses to start the installer's Discord bot unless the bot's username appears in the author-controlled allow-list — a hidden remote gate/kill-switch over the installer's runtime that is not disclosed in the README. Two live GitHub PATs are hardcoded in the shipped package (one in the git dependency URL, one as the default `ghToken` in `_validateAuthOptions`). The package name and metadata impersonate discord.js.

@velliajs/discord@1.0.4

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code