registry / @vibes.diy/api-svc / 14.3.231

@vibes.diy/api-svc@14.3.231

WebSocket-based API for vibes.diy chat persistence and app deployment. Supports both HTTP POST and WebSocket connections using the same handler via the Evento event-driven framework.

AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The manifest has no install hook, and the flagged avatar and alarm operations are administrative commands with dry-run behavior or explicit write flags. The credential and network flows are to the configured embedding backend, PostHog, and GitHub APIs for their stated purposes; no unrelated exfiltration or unauthorized action was found.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Embedding requests run when the embedding function is called; avatar writes require running the admin command with --apply; GitHub issue changes require --write.

Impact

No evidence of automatic credential theft, unrelated data collection, or unauthorized account actions.

Mechanism

The code sends embedding input to the configured backend and uses PostHog and api.github.com for named reporting tasks. Avatar data is transformed and written through the configured database and R2 workflow only in apply mode.

AI rationale

Network endpoints4

vibes.diyus.posthog.comapi.github.comconfigured embedding backend URL

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest points to index.js and has no install lifecycle script.
The avatar backfill is a dry run by default; it requires --apply for writes and uses the package's configured database and R2 workflow.
The alarm command reads PostHog settings from the environment, and GitHub issue updates occur only when --write is set.
First-message embeddings send text to the configured backend URL using that backend's supplied API key.

Evidence against

The package contains administrative scripts that access database records and can write avatar data when explicitly run with --apply.
Embedding requests send app text to a configured backend, as expected for the embedding feature.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

usage-report/backfill-avatars.jsView file

1import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import * as fs from "node:fs"; ... L24: NEON_DATABASE_ADMIN_URL write connection (required for --apply) L25: ASSET_FETCH_BASE public host serving /assets/cid/ (default https://vibes.diy) L26: --apply additionally shells out to \`wrangler r2 object put\` — wrangler must be ... L37: throw new Error(`fetch ${row.getURL} returned ${res.status}`); L38: const buf = Buffer.from(await res.arrayBuffer()); L39: if (buf.byteLength !== row.size) { ... L92: return Result.Err(`wrangler r2 object get exited ${res.status}`); L93: if (res.stdout.equals(work.newBytes) === false) L94: return Result.Err("stored avatar differs from transformed bytes"); ... L140: const apply = args.includes("--apply");

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

usage-report/backfill-avatars.jsView on unpkg · L1

140const apply = args.includes("--apply"); const base = process.env["ASSET_FETCH_BASE"] ?? "https://vibes.diy"; const connectionString = apply ? process.env["NEON_DATABASE_ADMI

Low

Ai Review Evidence

The avatar backfill is a dry run by default; it requires --apply for writes and uses the package's configured database and R2 workflow.

usage-report/backfill-avatars.jsView on unpkg · L140

Findings

1 Critical1 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationusage-report/backfill-avatars.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedintern/design-repair.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperusage-report/r2-affected-apps.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

LowAi Review Evidenceusage-report/backfill-avatars.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @vibes.diy/api-svc@14.3.231.

See all versions of @vibes.diy/api-svc for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @vibes.diy/api-svc@14.3.231 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-30 19:49:22.393Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @vibes.diy/api-svc / 14.3.231

@vibes.diy/api-svc@14.3.231

WebSocket-based API for vibes.diy chat persistence and app deployment. Supports both HTTP POST and WebSocket connections using the same handler via the Evento event-driven framework.

AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Embedding requests run when the embedding function is called; avatar writes require running the admin command with --apply; GitHub issue changes require --write.

Impact

No evidence of automatic credential theft, unrelated data collection, or unauthorized account actions.

Mechanism

AI rationale

Network endpoints4

vibes.diyus.posthog.comapi.github.comconfigured embedding backend URL

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest points to index.js and has no install lifecycle script.
The avatar backfill is a dry run by default; it requires --apply for writes and uses the package's configured database and R2 workflow.
The alarm command reads PostHog settings from the environment, and GitHub issue updates occur only when --write is set.
First-message embeddings send text to the configured backend URL using that backend's supplied API key.

Evidence against

The package contains administrative scripts that access database records and can write avatar data when explicitly run with --apply.
Embedding requests send app text to a configured backend, as expected for the embedding feature.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

usage-report/backfill-avatars.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

usage-report/backfill-avatars.jsView on unpkg · L1

140const apply = args.includes("--apply"); const base = process.env["ASSET_FETCH_BASE"] ?? "https://vibes.diy"; const connectionString = apply ? process.env["NEON_DATABASE_ADMI

Low

Ai Review Evidence

The avatar backfill is a dry run by default; it requires --apply for writes and uses the package's configured database and R2 workflow.

usage-report/backfill-avatars.jsView on unpkg · L140

Findings

1 Critical1 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationusage-report/backfill-avatars.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedintern/design-repair.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperusage-report/r2-affected-apps.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

LowAi Review Evidenceusage-report/backfill-avatars.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @vibes.diy/api-svc@14.3.231.

See all versions of @vibes.diy/api-svc for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @vibes.diy/api-svc@14.3.231 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-30 19:49:22.393Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.