registry / Data exfiltration / @viraatdas/rudder / 2.14.57

@viraatdas/rudder@2.14.57

A Claude Code-style terminal app for running coding agents with worktree-isolated runs.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

This is a dangerous, source-confirmed credential-upload capability reached by explicit cloud commands, not a proven silent install-time theft chain. Its automatic postinstall installation of a separate tool further increases supply-chain risk.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Running a Rudder Cloud launch, workspace, or handoff command.

Impact

Agent, cloud-provider, source-control, package-manager, and environment credentials can be sent to the vendor cloud service.

Mechanism

Archive credentials and project data, then upload a base64 snapshot.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsdist/cloud.js~/.claude/.credentials.json~/.codex/auth.json~/.aws/credentials~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db~/.npmrc~/.netrc

Network endpoints1

rudder-cloud-control.fly.dev

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

Its postinstall hook automatically installs jj through Homebrew or Cargo when jj is absent.
The explicit cloud-launch command archives a repository snapshot and posts its base64 contents to the vendor cloud service.
Cloud snapshots include agent credentials, cloud-provider configuration, shell files, and package-manager configuration by default.
The snapshot code captures a broad allowlist of secret environment variables, including OpenAI, AWS, GitHub, npm, database, and Slack credentials.
On macOS, cloud snapshot creation reads Claude credentials from the Keychain and stages them for upload.

Evidence against

Credential collection and upload are reached through explicit cloud commands rather than during package installation or import.
The manifest has no runtime dependency on another release of this package.
The postinstall command uses fixed command arguments and does not download or execute package-controlled remote code.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVars

Source & flagged code

21 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/util.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/util.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg

1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L7: import readline from "node:readline/promises"; L8: import { stdin as input, stdout as output } from "node:process"; L9: const DEFAULT_PATH = [ ... L24: export function rudderHome() { L25: return path.resolve(process.env.RUDDER_HOME?.trim() || path.join(os.homedir(), ".rudder")); L26: } ... L65: const raw = await fsp.readFile(filePath, "utf8"); L66: return JSON.parse(raw); L67: } ... L160: const TOOL_INSTALL_HINTS = {

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/improve/schedule.jsView file

7Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js -> dist/main.js -> dist/improve/index.js -> dist/improve/schedule.js L7: function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

7function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

dist/cloud.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cloud.js: "~/.claude/.credentials.json", "~/.claude/settings.json", "~/.claude/CLAUDE.md", "~/.claude.json", "~/.codex/auth.json", "~/.codex/config.toml", "~/.codex/AGENTS.md", "~/.codex/hooks.json",

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

scripts/postinstall.mjsView file

5// install: on any problem it prints guidance and exits 0. L6: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L7: ... L13: try { L14: const probe = process.platform === "win32" ? "where" : "which"; L15: return spawnSync(probe, [cmd], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0; ... L34: warn(" Rust: cargo install jj-cli"); L35: warn(" Other: https://jj-vcs.github.io/jj/latest/install-and-setup/"); L36: warn("Then run: rudder doctor"); ... L39: function main() { L40: if (process.env.RUDDER_SKIP_POSTINSTALL) { L41: return;

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L5

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

dist/native/darwin-arm64/rudder-nativeView file

•path = dist/native/darwin-arm64/rudder-native kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 3487504 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

dist/native/darwin-arm64/rudder-nativeView on unpkg

dist/improve/collect.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 6

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/improve/collect.jsView on unpkg

dist/backends.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/backends.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/backends.jsView on unpkg

dist/board/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/board/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/board/daemon.jsView on unpkg

dist/handoff.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/handoff.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/handoff.jsView on unpkg

dist/run-manager.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/run-manager.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/run-manager.jsView on unpkg

dist/task-summary.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/task-summary.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/task-summary.jsView on unpkg

dist/version-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/version-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/version-check.jsView on unpkg

dist/feedback.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/feedback.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/feedback.jsView on unpkg

dist/improve/state.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/improve/state.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/improve/state.jsView on unpkg

dist/models.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/models.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/models.jsView on unpkg

dist/main.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.51 matchedPath = dist/main.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.51 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/main.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

21 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/util.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg

Findings

17 High6 Medium5 Low

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cloud.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityscripts/postinstall.mjs

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/improve/schedule.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/improve/collect.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/util.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/backends.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/board/daemon.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/handoff.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/run-manager.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/task-summary.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.57.

See all versions of @viraatdas/rudder for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.57 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-01 00:54:35.773Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code