Loading npm security reports…

@viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / @viraatdas/rudder / 2.14.69

@viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69

A Claude Code-style terminal app for running coding agents with worktree-isolated runs.

AI Security Review

scanned 28d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package installs external software during npm postinstall, self-updates globally on ordinary CLI use, and packages credentials into cloud snapshots. A cloud launch sends the encoded archive to the Rudder control service.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm installation, any normal Rudder CLI command, or a Rudder cloud launch

Impact

Unconsented system mutation and exposure of agent, cloud, package-manager, and source-repository credentials to a third-party service.

Mechanism

automatic tool installation, self-update, and credential-bearing cloud snapshot upload

Attack narrative

Installing the package runs a hook that attempts to install jj. On ordinary CLI use, the program can globally install a newer release of itself. Its cloud-launch path collects default agent configuration and credentials, selected secrets from the environment, archives them with the repository, base64-encodes the archive, and posts it to the Rudder cloud control service. The broad credential collection is not necessary for a local CLI and creates a concrete data-exfiltration path.

AI rationale

The package combines automatic installation and self-updating with broad credential collection and remote upload. The cloud command is user-invoked, but its default snapshot behavior exposes highly sensitive credentials without granular consent.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsdist/main.jsdist/version-check.jsdist/cloud.js~/.claude/.credentials.json~/.codex/auth.json~/.codex/config.toml

Source & flagged code

21 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/util.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/util.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg

1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L7: import readline from "node:readline/promises"; L8: import { stdin as input, stdout as output } from "node:process"; L9: const DEFAULT_PATH = [ ... L24: export function rudderHome() { L25: return path.resolve(process.env.RUDDER_HOME?.trim() || path.join(os.homedir(), ".rudder")); L26: } ... L65: const raw = await fsp.readFile(filePath, "utf8"); L66: return JSON.parse(raw); L67: } ... L160: const TOOL_INSTALL_HINTS = {

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/improve/schedule.jsView file

7Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js -> dist/main.js -> dist/improve/index.js -> dist/improve/schedule.js L7: function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

7function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

dist/cloud.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cloud.js: "~/.claude/.credentials.json", "~/.claude/settings.json", "~/.claude/CLAUDE.md", "~/.claude.json", "~/.codex/auth.json", "~/.codex/config.toml", "~/.codex/AGENTS.md", "~/.codex/hooks.json",

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/cloud.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

scripts/postinstall.mjsView file

5// install: on any problem it prints guidance and exits 0. L6: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L7: ... L13: try { L14: const probe = process.platform === "win32" ? "where" : "which"; L15: return spawnSync(probe, [cmd], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0; ... L34: warn(" Rust: cargo install jj-cli"); L35: warn(" Other: https://jj-vcs.github.io/jj/latest/install-and-setup/"); L36: warn("Then run: rudder doctor"); ... L39: function main() { L40: if (process.env.RUDDER_SKIP_POSTINSTALL) { L41: return;

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L5

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView file

•path = dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-native kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 4102664 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView on unpkg

dist/improve/collect.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 6

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/improve/collect.jsView on unpkg

dist/usage.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/usage.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/usage.jsView on unpkg

dist/backends.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/backends.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/backends.jsView on unpkg

dist/board/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/board/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/board/daemon.jsView on unpkg

dist/handoff.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/handoff.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/handoff.jsView on unpkg

dist/run-manager.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/run-manager.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/run-manager.jsView on unpkg

dist/task-summary.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/task-summary.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/task-summary.jsView on unpkg

dist/version-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/version-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/version-check.jsView on unpkg

dist/feedback.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/feedback.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/feedback.jsView on unpkg

dist/improve/state.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/improve/state.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/improve/state.jsView on unpkg

dist/models.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.61 matchedPath = dist/models.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/models.jsView on unpkg