registry / @viraatdas/rudder / 2.15.4

@viraatdas/rudder@2.15.4

A TUI for managing coding agents: run Claude Code, Codex and opencode side by side, each in its own isolated jj workspace.

AI Security Review

scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected install behavior is limited to setting up the package's jj prerequisite. Credential handling is part of an explicitly invoked, package-aligned cloud workflow, and the other reviewed source paths show no concrete attack behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Package installation triggers the jj check; cloud credential staging requires invoking cloud attach.

Impact

No malicious impact was identified; cloud attach transfers setup data to the package's cloud service as part of the requested operation.

Mechanism

The hook checks for jj and may invoke brew or cargo. Cloud attach stages credentials in a workspace snapshot and sends it through Rudder Cloud.

AI rationale

Network endpoints1

rudder-cloud-control.fly.dev

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json routes postinstall to scripts/postinstall.mjs; that hook skips when jj is present and otherwise attempts a jj install.
Cloud credential staging and snapshot upload occur through the explicit cloud attach command. The snapshot uses the package's Rudder Cloud workflow.
The inspected handoff and model locations read local Claude conversation indexes and the Codex model cache.
Improvement collection reads registered project runs, and installing its scheduled job requires the explicit schedule install action.
Other inspected runtime code includes local home-path helpers, a loopback board token check, feedback redaction, and a time-limited registry version lookup.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

17 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/util.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = dist/util.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg

1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L7: import readline from "node:readline/promises"; L8: import { stdin as input, stdout as output } from "node:process"; L9: const DEFAULT_PATH = [ ... L24: export function rudderHome() { L25: return path.resolve(process.env.RUDDER_HOME?.trim() || path.join(os.homedir(), ".rudder")); L26: } ... L65: const raw = await fsp.readFile(filePath, "utf8"); L66: return JSON.parse(raw); L67: } ... L160: const TOOL_INSTALL_HINTS = {

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/improve/schedule.jsView file

7Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js -> dist/main.js -> dist/improve/index.js -> dist/improve/schedule.js L7: function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

7function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

dist/cloud.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cloud.js: "~/.claude/.credentials.json", "~/.claude/settings.json", "~/.claude/CLAUDE.md", "~/.claude.json", "~/.codex/auth.json", "~/.codex/config.toml", "~/.codex/AGENTS.md", "~/.codex/hooks.json",

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

scripts/postinstall.mjsView file

5// install: on any problem it prints guidance and exits 0. L6: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L7: ... L13: try { L14: const probe = process.platform === "win32" ? "where" : "which"; L15: return spawnSync(probe, [cmd], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0; ... L34: warn(" Rust: cargo install jj-cli"); L35: warn(" Other: https://jj-vcs.github.io/jj/latest/install-and-setup/"); L36: warn("Then run: rudder doctor"); ... L39: function main() { L40: if (process.env.RUDDER_SKIP_POSTINSTALL) { L41: return;

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L5

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView file

•path = dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-native kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 5041128 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView on unpkg

dist/improve/collect.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 6

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/improve/collect.jsView on unpkg

dist/board/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = dist/board/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/board/daemon.jsView on unpkg

dist/handoff.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = dist/handoff.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/handoff.jsView on unpkg

dist/version-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = dist/version-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/version-check.jsView on unpkg

dist/feedback.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = dist/feedback.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/feedback.jsView on unpkg

dist/improve/state.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = dist/improve/state.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/improve/state.jsView on unpkg

dist/models.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@2.14.69 matchedPath = dist/models.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:2.14.69 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/models.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

17 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/util.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg

Findings

13 High6 Medium5 Low

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cloud.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityscripts/postinstall.mjs

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/improve/schedule.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/improve/collect.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/util.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/board/daemon.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/handoff.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/version-check.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/feedback.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/improve/state.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @viraatdas/rudder@2.15.4.

See all versions of @viraatdas/rudder for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @viraatdas/rudder@2.15.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-14 22:31:57.756Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.