@vite-ln/build-ts@5.15.10

Package @vite-ln/build-ts copies the legitimate vite package's manifest verbatim (description 'Native-ESM powered web dev build tool', author 'Evan You', repository vitejs/vite, bin name 'vite') but is published under the unofficial scope @vite-ln rather than @vitejs. The tarball appends an obfuscated payload to the CLI entry bin/vite.js after the legitimate Vite bootstrap. The payload uses a shuffled, character-substituted string array decoded at runtime to recover endpoint hostnames, HTTP methods, and Node API names, then performs an HTTP(S) GET followed by a JSON-RPC 2.0 POST (an 'EtherHiding'-style retrieval where the payload is pulled from a blockchain RPC so the operator can rotate it without republishing), XOR-decodes the response with an embedded key, and executes the decoded bytes both via eval(r) and via a detached, hidden child_process.spawn('node', [..., r], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true}). Any developer who runs the vite CLI from this package (e.g., npx vite, npm run dev/build) executes attacker-controlled, dynamically rotated code on their machine with full developer privileges and a persisted detached process. Additional base64-decode-then-toString patterns appear in dist/node/chunks/dep-SDtFYyy1.js and dist/node/runtime.js, consistent with the same obfuscation family. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0b380eb60df5dc8d12ad64fe26e5c1ca08c4fa39505400ba90ea1a2d305121ff) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.