@wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk
This report shows the evidence for @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk@1.1.2. 8 of 8 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
OpenSSF/OSV Malicious Advisory
imported 3mo ago · by OpenSSF/OSVOpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-10033 confirms this npm version as malicious.
Advisory
MAL-2026-10033
Source
OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk (npm)
Details
The npm package `@wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Polymarket** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user's home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
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## Source: amazon-inspector (c939d03cb15cd37cd1e4f87e913daefd7407245c771ed23bf12a712cad2c5495) @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk@1.1.3 is a credential-stealing package disguised as a Polymarket SDK. index.js exports an empty object; the package ships no advertised functionality. On `npm install`, scripts.postinstall triggers postinstall.js, which: (1) walks the current working directory, the user's home directory, and common crypto-wallet paths (.ethereum,.solana,.bitcoin, Library/Ethereum) for files matching keystore/wallet/seed/mnemonic/private/.pem/.key patterns, regex-matches Ethereum private keys, BTC WIF keys, and BIP39 mnemonics, and POSTs matches to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint; (2) reads every file in ~/.ssh (excluding known_hosts, authorized_keys, and.pub files), harvesting id_rsa/id_ed25519 private keys, and POSTs each to the same endpoint; (3) enumerates process.env, filters for keys containing PRIVATE/SECRET/TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD/MNEMONIC/SEED/WALLET/AWS, and exfiltrates name=value pairs together with hostname, username, and cwd. All traffic is sent over plain HTTP to http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name impersonates a legitimate Polymarket SDK to attract developers likely to have crypto keys on disk.
Independent LPM AI assessment
CleanIndependent AI assessment: clean. LPM AI assessed this version as clean; the assessments disagree.
Static inspection found a postinstall hook, but the referenced postinstall.js is not shipped and the only entrypoint is an empty export. With no executable payload, network endpoint, credential access, or filesystem mutation, this is not malicious source behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
npm install attempts postinstall; runtime import loads empty index.js
Impact
install failure, no observed exfiltration or code execution payload
Mechanism
missing lifecycle script target and empty module export
AI rationale
Static inspection found a postinstall hook, but the referenced postinstall.js is not shipped and the only entrypoint is an empty export. With no executable payload, network endpoint, credential access, or filesystem mutation, this is not malicious source behavior.
Evidence
package.jsonindex.js
Independent scan evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 93.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json defines postinstall: node postinstall.js
- postinstall.js is absent from package file list, so install would fail rather than run reviewed payload
Evidence against
- index.js only contains module.exports={}
- Package contains only package.json and index.js
- No network, child_process, eval, env access, file writes, native binaries, or encoded payloads found
- No AI-agent control-surface writes or persistence logic found
Behavioral surface
Trivial
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
2 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
1 High1 Medium2 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
LowScripts Present
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk@1.1.2.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk@1.1.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
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