---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@wanzlonely/bails4u/v/2.0.0"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@wanzlonely/bails4u/v/2.0.0.md"
package: "@wanzlonely/bails4u"
report_status: "published"
title: "@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "2.0.0"
---

# @wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — May evade platform spam controls and disclose operational risk metadata to caller-configured endpoints.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 2.0.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

Trusted malware advisory MAL-2026-17381 identifies this version as malicious. Firewall keeps the version blocked under its trusted-intelligence policy. An AI recommendation to allow or warn does not override that advisory.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

At runtime, the default anti-ban wrapper modifies outbound WhatsApp message content. Configured alert webhooks can transmit risk data to external endpoints; no unconsented install-time attack was confirmed.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 89.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-30T10:27:47.800Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-30T10:30:18.483Z
- **Download time:** 260 ms
- **Static scan time:** 13816 ms
- **AI review time:** 136607 ms
- **Total time:** 150683 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** At runtime, the default anti-ban wrapper modifies outbound WhatsApp message content. Configured alert webhooks can transmit risk data to external endpoints; no unconsented install-time attack was confirmed.

- **Trigger:** Creating a socket and sending messages; configuring anti-ban alerts enables webhook delivery.

- **Impact:** May evade platform spam controls and disclose operational risk metadata to caller-configured endpoints.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/index.js, lib/antiban.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-30T10:30:18.483Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Default message variation and configured webhook posting.

- **Rationale:** No concrete malicious lifecycle, credential theft, or remote payload execution was found. However, the default anti-ban and message-variation features are a meaningful platform-evasion capability, so this release should be warned rather than marked clean.

- **Network endpoints:** api.telegram.org

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 89.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** Anti-ban behavior is enabled by default and wraps message sending., The runtime alters message text with invisible characters and punctuation variation., Webhook alerts can send runtime risk data to configured URLs, including Telegram., The install hook runs only a Node-version check., The reported constants file is a protocol token table, not a harvested secret., The oversized WAProto file is generated protobuf-style code.

- **Evidence against:** No install-time network, file-harvesting, shell, or project-mutation behavior was found., The preinstall script only exits for Node versions below 20., Webhook delivery requires caller-provided alert configuration., No concrete credential-exfiltration or remote-payload chain was identified.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0.

- Avoid installing @wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/antiban.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/lib/antiban.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L11: 
L12: const require2 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L13:
```

### 6. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L107: pull: false,
L108: devicePairingData: {
L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L158: ]);
L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
```

### 7. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 8. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 9. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 302
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 13. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/WAProto/index.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = WAProto/index.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 8100533
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 15. Medium: Git Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package manifest contains a git dependency.

### 16. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/WAProto/index.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 4
```

### 17. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@wanzlonely/bails4u@2.0.0/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall, prepare
- **Dependencies:** 13
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 31
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 17

### Published dependency entries
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- libsignal github:wanzchil/libsignal-node (Dependency)
- lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency)
- p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- pino ^9.6 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^8.8.0 (Dependency)
- whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.4 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency)
- jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @wanzlonely/bails4u
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.0.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-07T12:43:59.574Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-30T10:30:18.483Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-09-30T10:30:18.483Z
- **Known versions:** 4
- **Latest version:** 5.0.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** A WebSockets library for interacting with WhatsApp Web — Wanz Lonely fork of Baileys
- **Author:** Wanz Lonely
- **Maintainers:** wanzlonely
- **Keywords:** wanzlonely, wanz, baileys, whatsapp, whatsapp-api, whatsapp-web, wa-bot, whatsapp bot
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 144
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 12,137,947 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@wanzlonely/bails4u/v/2.0.0>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/wanzchil/Xbails>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/wanzchil/Xbails/issues>)
- [OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17381>)
- [OpenSSF JSON](<https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/@wanzlonely/bails4u/MAL-2026-17381.json>)
- [ARTICLE](<https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/>)
