registry / @wayai/cli / 0.3.182
@wayai/cli@0.3.182
WayAI CLI — sync hub configuration between local files and the platform
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source supports a guarded agent extension capability rather than malware. The supplied policy calls for a warning for first-party package-owned agent setup, while the absence of install hooks and concrete attack behavior does not support blocking.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Running a normal CLI command with an existing WayAI skill, or explicitly running wayai admin skill install.
Impact
Installed skills can influence agent behavior. Existing-file guards and relative-path validation limit mutation; no automatic skill replacement or malicious payload was established.
Mechanism
Creates a Claude skill symlink or downloads authenticated platform skill files and writes them into project agent skill directories.
AI rationale
Inspected source supports a guarded agent extension capability rather than malware. The supplied policy calls for a warning for first-party package-owned agent setup, while the absence of install hooks and concrete attack behavior does not support blocking.
Evidence
dist/index.js.claude.opencode.agents
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json has no npm install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- The flagged code identifies WayAI skill locations under .claude, .opencode, and .agents.
- Ordinary CLI commands can automatically link an existing WayAI skill into Claude's skill directory, preserving existing skill files and non-symbolic entries.
- The explicit admin skill install command authenticates to the configured platform and writes downloaded skill files into agent skill directories.
- Downloaded file names pass a relative-path safety check before writing.
Evidence against
- The integration is limited to package-owned skills and CLI activation; no confirmed malicious install-time mutation was established.
- Background version checks cache versions and suggest explicit update commands rather than automatically replacing installed skills.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
21603});
L21604: import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
L21605: import * as fs3 from "fs";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
// Stripe API keys and webhook signing secrets. Keep this aligned with
// LLM provider API keys. The captured delimiter is deliberate: `_` may
var uuidSchema, USER_ID_REGEX, paginationSchema, timestampSchema, idParamSchema, clientOptionalString, clientOptionalBoolean, clientOptionalNumber, messageAttachment, MAX_MESSAGE_B...
[AUTH_TYPE.API_KEY]:
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg51while (cursor < text.length) {
L52: while (cursor < text.length && !isBase64UrlChar(text[cursor])) cursor++;
L53: const headerStart = cursor;
...
L236: "use strict";
L237: CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
L238: NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
...
L249: [/\bway_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "way_[REDACTED]"],
L250: // wst_ single-use WebSocket tickets (same opaque base64url format).
L251: [/\bwst_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "wst_[REDACTED]"],
...
L366: try {
L367: const __dirname2 = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
L368: const pkg2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname2, "..", "
Findings
7 High4 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/index.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wayai/cli@0.3.182.
See all versions of @wayai/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wayai/cli@0.3.182 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.