@wayai/cli@0.3.195
WayAI CLI — sync hub configuration between local files and the platform
AI Security Review
scanned 27d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe configurable API destination can receive the WayAI session token without an allowlist, a concrete conditional credential exposure that warrants a warning. No source evidence establishes covert theft or an automatic install-time attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs `wayai login --api-url <URL>` and later runs an authenticated CLI command.
Impact
The selected endpoint can receive the user's WayAI access token; source inspection does not show a built-in destination allowlist.
Mechanism
Login stores the chosen URL with the WayAI token; the API client uses that URL for requests and attaches the token as a bearer credential.
AI rationale
The configurable API destination can receive the WayAI session token without an allowlist, a concrete conditional credential exposure that warrants a warning. No source evidence establishes covert theft or an automatic install-time attack.
Evidence
dist/index.jspackage.json
Network endpoints2
api.wayai.prosprightly-comic-51.authkit.app
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI accepts a caller-supplied `--api-url` without a visible destination restriction.
- Browser login obtains a WayAI access token and persists the selected API URL for later commands.
- The API client builds requests from that configured URL and sends its access token as a bearer credential.
- The configured URL is also used by the explicit update command; no automatic lifecycle hook is declared.
Evidence against
- The default API endpoint is `https://api.wayai.pro`, and browser authentication uses the WayAI AuthKit domain.
- The agent skill paths are WayAI-owned integration locations, and `wayai init` only prints an instruction to install the skill.
- The package has no preinstall, install, or postinstall script in its manifest.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
14843});
L14844: import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
L14845: import * as fs3 from "fs";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
// Stripe API keys and webhook signing secrets. Keep this aligned with
// LLM provider API keys. The captured delimiter is deliberate: `_` may
api_key: { type: "password", label: "Resend API Key", placeholder: "re_xxxxxxxxxx", description: "From resend.com/api-keys", required: true, maskInEdit: true, useExistingPlaceholde...
api_key: { type: "pa
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg51while (cursor < text.length) {
L52: while (cursor < text.length && !isBase64UrlChar(text[cursor])) cursor++;
L53: const headerStart = cursor;
...
L236: "use strict";
L237: CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
L238: NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
...
L249: [/\bway_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "way_[REDACTED]"],
L250: // wst_ single-use WebSocket tickets (same opaque base64url format).
L251: [/\bwst_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "wst_[REDACTED]"],
...
L366: try {
L367: const __dirname2 = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
L368: const pkg2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname2, "..", "
Findings
7 High4 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/index.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wayai/cli@0.3.195.
See all versions of @wayai/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wayai/cli@0.3.195 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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