@wayai/cli@0.3.206
WayAI CLI — sync hub configuration between local files and the platform
AI Security Review
scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI permits an unrestricted API URL and forwards the WayAI bearer token to it, creating a conditional credential exposure risk. The default endpoint is package-aligned and the override is caller-selected, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user invokes login with `--api-url` set to an unrelated endpoint, or authenticated commands use a configuration containing such an endpoint.
Impact
The selected endpoint receives the bearer token and may be able to use it as a WayAI credential.
Mechanism
The login parser accepts the supplied URL without validation, and token validation sends the bearer token to its `/api/auth/me` path. Later authenticated commands read the saved API URL and token.
AI rationale
The CLI permits an unrestricted API URL and forwards the WayAI bearer token to it, creating a conditional credential exposure risk. The default endpoint is package-aligned and the override is caller-selected, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Evidence
dist/index.jspackage.json
Network endpoints1
api.wayai.pro
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Login accepts an arbitrary endpoint through `--api-url`, with no destination check in the parser.
- Token validation sends a bearer token to the selected endpoint’s `/api/auth/me` route.
- Authenticated commands load a saved API URL and token before making requests.
- The package has no install lifecycle hook; the flagged agent integration constants name WayAI skill files and directories.
Evidence against
- The default API endpoint is the package’s WayAI service, and the endpoint override is explicitly supplied when invoking login.
- The agent integration excerpt only defines skill installation paths; it does not itself mutate agent configuration.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
15326});
L15327: import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
L15328: import * as fs3 from "fs";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
// Stripe API keys and webhook signing secrets. Keep this aligned with
// LLM provider API keys. The captured delimiter is deliberate: `_` may
api_key: { type: "password", label: "Resend API Key", placeholder: "re_xxxxxxxxxx", description: "From resend.com/api-keys", required: true, maskInEdit: true, useExistingPlaceholde...
api_key: { type: "pa
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg51while (cursor < text.length) {
L52: while (cursor < text.length && !isBase64UrlChar(text[cursor])) cursor++;
L53: const headerStart = cursor;
...
L236: "use strict";
L237: CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
L238: NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
...
L249: [/\bway_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "way_[REDACTED]"],
L250: // wst_ single-use WebSocket tickets (same opaque base64url format).
L251: [/\bwst_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "wst_[REDACTED]"],
...
L366: try {
L367: const __dirname2 = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
L368: const pkg2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname2, "..", "
Findings
7 High4 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/index.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wayai/cli@0.3.206.
See all versions of @wayai/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wayai/cli@0.3.206 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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