registry / @wayai/cli / 0.3.215
@wayai/cli@0.3.215
WayAI CLI — sync hub configuration between local files and the platform
AI Security Review
scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe concrete agent-facing behavior is a scoped first-party skill-link repair, which merits a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected login flow defaults to WayAI's API and AuthKit, and the manifest has no install hook supporting the scanner's stronger claims.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Run a non-help WayAI CLI command while the repository contains `.agents/skills/wayai/SKILL.md` and the corresponding Claude Code skill file is missing.
Impact
Claude Code can load the existing WayAI skill. No code execution or broad agent-setting change is established by this behavior.
Mechanism
The CLI creates `.claude/skills/wayai` as a symlink to the existing `.agents/skills/wayai` directory; it skips help commands and does not replace a non-symlink entry.
AI rationale
The concrete agent-facing behavior is a scoped first-party skill-link repair, which merits a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected login flow defaults to WayAI's API and AuthKit, and the manifest has no install hook supporting the scanner's stronger claims.
Evidence
dist/index.js.agents/skills/wayai/SKILL.md.claude/skills/wayai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest exposes `dist/index.js` as the CLI entrypoint and defines no install lifecycle hooks.
- The bundle recognizes `.claude`, `.opencode`, and `.agents` skill directories for the WayAI skill.
- When the existing `.agents/skills/wayai/SKILL.md` is present and its Claude Code counterpart is missing, the bundle creates a symlink for that first-party skill.
- The repair runs on non-help CLI commands, so it is not an npm install-time action.
- Login uses `https://api.wayai.pro` by default; `--api-url` lets the caller select another API endpoint.
- Browser login exchanges an authorization code with the configured AuthKit domain and client, then stores the returned tokens.
Evidence against
- The package scripts contain build, development, typecheck, and test tasks, with no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The inspected login flow does not show a fixed unofficial gateway receiving the credentials.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVars
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
15258});
L15259: import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
L15260: import * as fs3 from "fs";
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
// Stripe API keys and webhook signing secrets. Keep this aligned with
// LLM provider API keys. The captured delimiter is deliberate: `_` may
api_key: { type: "password", label: "Resend API Key", placeholder: "re_xxxxxxxxxx", description: "From resend.com/api-keys", required: true, maskInEdit: true, useExistingPlaceholde...
api_key: { type: "pa
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg51while (cursor < text.length) {
L52: while (cursor < text.length && !isBase64UrlChar(text[cursor])) cursor++;
L53: const headerStart = cursor;
...
L236: "use strict";
L237: CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /token|secret|credential|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt/i;
L238: NUMERIC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = /(?:password|passwd|pin|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|authorization|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|cookie|jwt)$/i;
...
L249: [/\bway_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "way_[REDACTED]"],
L250: // wst_ single-use WebSocket tickets (same opaque base64url format).
L251: [/\bwst_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g, "wst_[REDACTED]"],
...
L366: try {
L367: const __dirname2 = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
L368: const pkg2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname2, "..", "
Findings
7 High4 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/index.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wayai/cli@0.3.215.
See all versions of @wayai/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wayai/cli@0.3.215 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.