@wdio/browserstack-service@9.39.2
WebdriverIO service for better Browserstack integration
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected entrypoints implement BrowserStack testing, diagnostics, and CLI management without an installation attack chain. No concrete credential diversion, broad agent-control mutation, or malicious persistence was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has no install lifecycle hooks or runtime dependency on itself.
- build/cleanup.js requires upload arguments and BrowserStack credentials before uploading service logs.
- build/index.js sends log archives to BrowserStack observability endpoints.
- Captured test configuration passes through sensitive-content redaction.
- Regional endpoint updates come from the BrowserStack CLI session response.
- Subprocess execution starts the testing SDK CLI, and archive extraction rejects paths outside its directory.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedSource combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
build/index.jsView on unpkg · L19Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wdio/browserstack-service@9.39.2.
See all versions of @wdio/browserstack-service for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wdio/browserstack-service@9.39.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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