registry  /  @weactive8/8contentpro  /  0.1.4

@weactive8/8contentpro@0.1.4

ICP-driven content marketing as a CLI. Runs the WeActive8 Blog Protocol on your own Claude (BYOC).

Static Scan Results

scanned 6h ago · by rust-scanner

Static analysis flagged 12 finding(s) at 72.0% confidence. This version is warn-only unless an AI or security-team review confirms malicious behavior.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Decision evidence

public snapshot
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 33 file(s), 217 KB of source, external domains: 8contentpro.com, 8cp-upload.wa8.us, 8cp.wa8.us, api.sapling.ai, go.timesolv.com, weactive8.com, yourcompany.com

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source
dist/ink/App.jsView file
6import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; L7: import { exec } from "node:child_process"; L8: import { InputBox, Menu, Spinner, StatusBar, Header, Picker } from "./components.js";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/ink/App.jsView on unpkg · L6
dist/attach.jsView file
1import { exec } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { startSpinner, updateSpinner, stopSpinner } from "./ui/spinner.js"; ... L6: * chooses a file, and it comes back as an https URL that Claude fetches during L7: * generation. See server/upload.mjs (https://8cp-upload.wa8.us). L8: */ L9: const UPLOAD_BASE = process.env.CONTENTPRO_UPLOAD_URL?.trim() || "https://8cp-upload.wa8.us"; L10: export function openBrowser(url) {
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/attach.jsView on unpkg · L1
1import { exec } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { startSpinner, updateSpinner, stopSpinner } from "./ui/spinner.js"; ... L6: * chooses a file, and it comes back as an https URL that Claude fetches during L7: * generation. See server/upload.mjs (https://8cp-upload.wa8.us). L8: */ L9: const UPLOAD_BASE = process.env.CONTENTPRO_UPLOAD_URL?.trim() || "https://8cp-upload.wa8.us"; L10: export function openBrowser(url) { L11: const cmd = process.platform === "darwin" ? "open" : process.platform === "win32" ? 'start ""' : "xdg-open"; L12: exec(`${cmd} "${url}"`, () => { }); // best-effort; the URL is also printed for manual open ... L19: return null; L20: return (await res.json()); L21: }
High
Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/attach.jsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

4 High3 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processdist/ink/App.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/attach.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/attach.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License