@whalent/agent-core@0.3.484
Core runtime for Whalent Agent
AI Security Review
scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiExplicit runtime actions can modify agent skills and MCP configuration, warranting a behavior-specific warning under the supplied policy. No block-eligible attack chain was established; the main bundle also exceeds the citation tool's verification limit.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI and has no npm install hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- The MCP tool handler accepts registration requests and passes caller-selected commands, arguments, and environment settings to agent configuration writers.
- The Claude configuration writer persists changes to .claude.json.
- An explicit install action downloads skill files and installs them for the selected provider and scope.
- Skill destinations include .claude and .agents directories.
- Configuration changes are activated through runtime tool actions; inspected source does not establish unconsented npm installation mutation.
- No concrete malicious exfiltration or hidden payload execution was established.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent-core@0.3.484.
See all versions of @whalent/agent-core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent-core@0.3.484 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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