@whalent/agent-core@0.3.485
Core runtime for Whalent Agent
AI Security Review
scanned 21d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource confirms explicit agent configuration mutation, which warrants a warning under the supplied policy. No block-eligible attack was established, and obfuscation alone does not prove malware.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The MCP registration operation accepts a command, arguments, and environment, then injects that server into the selected agent configuration.
- The OpenCode configuration writer persists modified configuration to disk.
- The Codex server injector accesses config.toml in the supplied configuration directory.
- The manifest declares ssh2 and optional node-pty dependencies, with no lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- Configuration mutation is activated by an explicit MCP tool operation rather than npm installation.
- No concrete credential theft, covert payload execution, or malicious install chain was established.
- Heavy obfuscation limits confidence in the remaining entrypoint behavior; the inspected Function constructor is schema-validation code.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourceA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L4Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent-core@0.3.485.
See all versions of @whalent/agent-core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent-core@0.3.485 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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