@whalent/agent-core@0.3.496
Core runtime for Whalent Agent
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected bundle exposes agent configuration and skill-writing capabilities, but the evidence does not establish their callers or consent gates. This leaves an unresolved agent capability risk, without evidence of an active attack or install-time trigger.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a bundled command-line entrypoint and lists dist/mcp.cjs as package content.
- The bundle reads and writes Claude configuration and can add an MCP server entry.
- The bundle also contains a skill installation routine that writes files; the available excerpts do not establish its caller or consent gate.
- The manifest defines no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The inspected excerpts do not establish credential collection, exfiltration, or an active attack.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent-core@0.3.496.
See all versions of @whalent/agent-core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent-core@0.3.496 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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