@whalent/agent@0.3.371
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe unrestricted pairing of an existing agent token with an operator-configured gateway is a concrete conditional credential-exposure risk. There is no evidence of covert installation or a confirmed malicious export, so blocking is not warranted.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package has no npm install lifecycle hook; its published executable is dist/index.cjs.
- The executable invokes the core runtime for normal commands and performs its wrapper update only after that user-invoked path begins.
- The core accepts both a caller-configured gateway and a Codex agent token from environment variables without visible destination validation in this configuration path.
- I found no install-time hook, hidden default endpoint, or confirmed request sink that sends the token to an unrelated recipient.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.371.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.371 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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