@whalent/agent@0.3.408
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe absence of an install lifecycle hook rules out an automatic install-time attack, but opaque executable code combined with runtime installation and remote worker control is an unresolved security risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The executable entry point is deliberately obfuscated, preventing meaningful audit of its runtime behavior.
- The launcher includes a runtime core-version installer that invokes an external executable with inherited environment variables.
- The package describes a daemon that accepts remote upgrade and restart commands and auto-starts configured workers.
- package.json has only a prepublishOnly script; there is no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- No concrete credential theft, destructive command, or hidden network endpoint was recoverable by static inspection.
- The Python sidecar is a local Jupyter-kernel protocol helper and contains no network client.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.408.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.408 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.