@whalent/agent@0.3.424
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete install-time attack, secret theft, or destructive behavior was established. The opaque privileged runtime updater and remote-control capabilities remain an unresolved security risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The published CLI entrypoint is deliberately obfuscated into a single large line, preventing meaningful audit of its runtime update, persistence, and command logic.
- When the daemon runs, it is designed to fetch and activate helper releases automatically and to accept gateway-issued upgrade and restart commands.
- The package ships a Jupyter sidecar that executes supplied notebook code in a local kernel.
- The manifest includes only a prepublish hook, so installing this release does not automatically execute its code.
- No preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook is present.
- No runtime dependency on @whalent/agent itself is declared; the optional runtime package is @whalent/agent-core.
- No concrete secret-exfiltration endpoint or destructive action was established by source inspection.
- The Jupyter execution path is an explicit sidecar RPC capability rather than hidden import-time execution.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.424.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.424 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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